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THE TATAR-COSSACK INVASION OF 1648:
MILITARY ACTIONS, MATERIAL DESTRUCTION AND
DEMOGRAPHIC LOSSES IN THE LAND OF PRZEMYŚL*

‘Annus hic 1648 pessimus erat pro toto Regno Poloniae specialiter vero pro parte Russiae’.¹ These words, entered in the chronicle of the Franciscan monastery in Lvov and referring to the events related to the Cossack rebellion headed by Bohdan Chmielnicki (Khmel’nyts’kyi),² contain a general, though accurate, reflection on the situation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and especially its Red Ruthenian lands, in the face of the outbreak of the Cossack uprising in the spring of 1648. The inhabitants of the Commonwealth’s south-eastern territories were heavily affected by the military campaign, and the scale and extent of devastations, inflicted by the Tatar troops and their Cossack auxiliaries, were unprecedented when compared with the effects of the single Tatar raids which occurred in the previous decades.³

* *Ziemia przemyska* (lit. ‘the Land of Przemyśl’) was a part of medieval Red Ruthenia and an administrative sub-unit of the early modern palatinate of Ruthenia (Pol. *województwo ruskie*), which was centered in Lvov. See also fn. 4 below.

¹ The Lviv National Vasyl Stefanyk Scientific Library of Ukraine (hereafter: LNSL), fond 5, op. 1, Kolekcja Ossolińskich (hereafter: KO), ref. no. 2286, Monumentum tum ex actis Conventus Leopoliensis S[anc]ta Crucis Ordinis Minorum conventualium idiomae (ut sequitur) latino. Tum ex actis P.P. Ordinis Praedicatorum idiomae Polonico descriptum, p. 1.

² Proper names in parentheses, unless otherwise marked, are in Ukrainian.

³ Cf. Andrzej Gliwa, ‘Najazd tatarski na ziemię przemyską w 1624 r.’, *Rocznik Przemyski*, xli, 1: *Historia wojskowości* (2005), 27–80; *idem*, ‘Zimowy najazd Tatarów krymskich na Rzeczpospolitą w 1626 r. i jego skutki na terenie ziemi przemyskiej’, *ibidem*, xlii, 1: *Historia wojskowości* (2006), 3–58; *idem*, ‘Jesienny najazd Tatarów krymskich i budżackich na Rzeczpospolitą w 1629 r. i jego skutki na terenie ziemi przemyskiej’, *ibidem*, xliii, 1: *Historia wojskowości* (2007), 105–55; Maurycy Horn, *Skutki ekonomiczne najazdów tatarskich z lat 1605–1633 na Ruś Czerwoną* (Wrocław, 1964), 21–61, 95–166.

It is worth stressing that the traumatic experience became the common lot of the members of various ethno-religious groups, be they Ruthenians (i.e., Ukrainians), Poles, or Jews.

The present article aims to reconstruct the military campaign which took place in the autumn of 1648 and, especially, to measure the extent of war destruction and demographic losses inflicted in the Land of Przemyśl, the furthest part of the palatinate (voivodeship) of Ruthenia, which was affected during this campaign by the activity of Tatar-Cossack troops.⁴

This was one of the largest military campaigns, directed against the Commonwealth's territories, which took place in the seventeenth century. Notwithstanding the extensive historical literature devoted to the Cossack uprising, the picture of its events still remains largely distorted due to the myths created, beginning from the nineteenth century, by Ukrainian and Russian historiography, and especially by Soviet historiography, beginning from the late 1930s. The latter, heavily loaded ideologically and politically, depicted Bohdan Chmielnicki and the effects of his activity in a way that was both instrumental and, at the same time, overly idealistic. A very similar and generally one-sided picture of the events of the mid-seventeenth century can be found in contemporary, post-Soviet Ukrainian historiography, both in the writings of the historians ascribed to the 'national-stately paradigm', and those ascribed to the 'stately-national' one.⁵

Nonetheless, in the recent years, one can observe a certain shift in the attitude of Ukrainian historiography in regard to the subject of our study. A small but rising number of researchers, influenced by new methodological currents coming belatedly from the West, have challenged the 'established truths' and adopted a non-dogmatic stand,

⁴ The Land of Przemyśl covered the territory of 12,070 km²; in the first half of the 17th century, it was divided into four districts: of Przemyśl, Sambor, Drohobycz and Stryj; see Kazimierz Przyboś, 'Granice ziemi przemyskiej w czasach nowożytnych XVI-XVIII wiek', *Rocznik Przemyski*, xxix-xxx (1993-94), 189. In the present article, I deliberately adopt the term 'Tatar-Cossack invasion' and not 'Cossack-Tatar invasion', as has been commonly used in the Polish historiography, because, in my opinion, there is no doubt as to who from among the two allies was the stronger partner in regard to both the political standing and military strength, and whose voice was decisive in regard to the way of conduct of military actions in the autumn of 1648.

⁵ Tomasz Stryjek, *Jakiej przeszłości potrzebuje przyszłość? Interpretacje dziejów narodowych w historiografii i debacie publicznej na Ukrainie 1991-2004* (Seria Wschodnia, Warsaw, 2007), 253-65.

not burdened with ideology, towards the Polish-Cossack conflict. Especially worth noting are the studies by Natalya Yakovenko⁶ and Viktor Brekhunenko,⁷ in which one can find new interpretations of the eventful developments of the late 1640s. However, the military activities of the invaders have usually been treated as a mere fragment of the great Cossack uprising, or as one more Tatar raid in the long history of Polish-Tatar relations, which allowed for at most a superficial description of this campaign.⁸ Admittedly, in the recent years a few studies appeared, focused on the military activities in western Ruthenian lands belonging to the Polish Crown, which were reached by the wave of the Cossack rising. Nonetheless, in regard to the events of the second half of the year 1648, both the Polish and Ukrainian historians typically limited their descriptions to the sieges of Lvov and Zamość, neglecting the predatory operation effected by the Tatars and Cossacks in the western part of Red Ruthenia.⁹

⁶ Natalya Yakovenko, 'Viina yak remeslo, abo shche raz pro kozatski viiny seredyny XVII stolittya', *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, cix, 3 (2002), 119–33; *eadem*, *Narys istorii seređn'ovichnoi ta rann'omodernoї Ukraїny* (Kiev, 2006), 313–348; *eadem*, *Druga strona lustra. Z historii wyobrażeń i idei na Ukrainie XVI–XVII wieku*, trans. Katarzyna Kotyńska (Warsaw, 2010), 233.

⁷ Viktor Brekhunenko, *Moskovs'ka Ekspansiya i pereyaslavs'ka rada 1654 roku* (Kiev, 2005), 187–236.

⁸ Cf. Franciszek Rawita Gawroński, *Bohdan Chmielnicki do elekcyi Jana Kazimierza* (Lvov, 1906), 319–32; Władysław Tomkiewicz, *Jeremi Wiśniowiecki (1612–1651)* (Rozprawy Historyczne Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego, 12, Warsaw, 1933), 243–60; Bohdan Baranowski, 'Geneza sojuszu kozacko-tatarskiego z 1648 r.', *Przegląd Historyczny*, xxxvii (1948), 276–87; Zbigniew Wójcik, *Dzikie Pola w ogniu. O Kozaczyźnie w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej* (3rd edn, Biblioteka Wiedzy Historycznej. Historia Polski, Warsaw, 1968), 210–18; Leszek Podhorodecki, *Chanał krymski i jego stosunki z Polską w XVI–XVIII w.* (Warsaw, 1987), 174–6; Janusz Kaczmarczyk, *Bohdan Chmielnicki* (Wrocław etc., 1988), 65–77; Benon Miśkiewicz, 'Obłężenie Lwowa w 1648 roku przez Bohdana Chmielnickiego', in Zbigniew Karpus, Tomasz Kempa and Dorota Michaluk (eds.), *Europa Orientalis. Polska i jej wschodni sąsiedzi od Średniowiecza po współczesność. Studia i materiały ofiarowane profesorowi Stanisławowi Alexandrowiczowi w 65. rocznicę urodzin* (Toruń, 1996), 259–67; Władysław A. Serczyk, *Na płonącej Ukrainie. Dzieje Kozaczyzny 1648–1651* (Warsaw, 1998), 151–69; Maciej Franz, *Wojskowość Kozaczyzny Zaporoskiej w XVI–XVII wieku. Geneza i charakter* (Toruń, 2004), 218–19; Andrzej B. Pernal, *Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów a Ukraina. Stosunki dyplomatyczne w latach 1648–1659*, trans. from English Robert Urbański (Cracow, 2010), 66.

⁹ Among the few exemptions, one should list the studies by Zygmunt Abrahamowicz (the introduction to his edition of the Crimean chronicle of Hadji

The research on the material losses then caused by the activity of the Tatar and Cossack troops is still in its infancy. We know relatively more about the size and extent of devastations inflicted in the central part of the palatinate of Ruthenia (the Land of Lvov) and the neighbouring lands of the palatinate of Volhynia than in the western part of the former one, which constituted the extensive Land of Przemyśl. Over a century ago, the effects of the Tatar-Cossack raid were studied by a Ukrainian historian, Stepan Tomashivs'kyi.¹⁰ He concluded that in the Land of Lvov alone, the troops headed in liaison by the Crimean *qalga*, Qırım Giray, and Chmielnicki, devastated a few hundred villages.¹¹ More recently, a young Ukrainian historian, Oleg B. Jaroshynskyi, addressed the question of material and demographic losses in Volhynia, which had resulted from massive riots of local subjects, inspired and aided by Cossack insurgents.¹² Also in the recent years, the social and economic effects of the Tatar-Cossack raids have become the subject of interest among the Polish scholars of regional history. Yet, their research has covered, so far, only selected towns and small areas of the Land of Przemyśl and of the neighbouring early modern palatinate of Bełz.¹³

Mehmed Senai; see Hadży Mehmed Senai z Krymu, *Historia chana Islam Gereja III*, ed. Zygmunt Abrahamowicz, with historical commentaries by Olgierd Górka and Zbigniew Wójcik [Warsaw, 1971] [hereafter: Senai, *Historia*; I used the Polish transl.], 34–9) and Józef Półćwiartek (*idem*, 'Najdalszy zachodni pochód wojsk Bohdana Chmielnickiego – mit a rzeczywistość', in Leonid Zashkil'nyak (ed.), *Kozats'ki viiny XVII stolittya v istorychniï svidomosti pol's'kogo ta ukraïns'kogo narodiv* (Lvov and Lublin, 1996), 76–91.

¹⁰ Stepan Tomashivs'kyi, 'Poglyad na stan lyudnosti Lvivs'koï zemli v polovyni XVII st.', in *idem* (ed.), *Materiyaly do istoriï Galychyny* (*Monumenta historica res gestas Haliciae illustrantia*) (hereafter: MrgHI), ii: *Akty z r. 1649–1651* (Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusi [Fontes Historiae Ukraino-Russicae]) [hereafter: FHU-R], v, Lvov, 1901), i-ii; *idem*, *Pershyi pokhid Bogdana Khmel'nyts'kogo v Galychynu* (*Dva misyatsi ukraïns'koï polityky 1648 r.*), (Lvov, 1914), 37–120.

¹¹ *Idem*, 'Poglyad', xxxvi. The joint estimation proposed by Tomashivs'kyi concerned the number of villages raided by Tatar-Cossack troops in the years 1648 and 1649, hence on the basis of his article it is impossible to establish the number of villages raided in the autumn of 1648.

¹² Oleg B. Yaroshynskyi, *Volyn' u roky ukraïns'koï natsional'noï revolyutsii seredyny XVII st.* (Kiev, 2005), 210–49.

¹³ Dariusz Wojnarski, 'Łosy miast ziemi lubaczowskiej na trasie pochodu wojsk Bohdana Chmielnickiego w roku 1648', *Rocznik Lubaczowski*, vi (1996), 32–41; *idem*, 'Następstwa materialno-demograficzne napadu wojsk kozacko-tatarskich na

The basic source material, which enables a detailed calculation of the damages caused by the Tatars and Cossacks in the Land of Przemyśl consists of three series of the so-called *abiurata*.¹⁴ The most important and rich is the collection of sworn declarations (Lat. *iuramenta*), recorded in the castle court (*sąd grodzki*) in Przemyśl in the period between 22 February 1649 and 4 October 1658. It is worth stressing that these declarations contain not only information regarding taxable objects, both devastated during the invasion and left intact, but also detailed data on the number of people kidnapped or killed by the invaders. They are preserved in the corpus of Przemyśl castle court records (Pol. *akta grodzkie przemyskie*), in volume no. 1069, entitled *Acta iuramentorum per cives oppidanos et subditos de civitatibus, oppidis atq[ue] villis terrae praemisliensis & districtus praevorscensis super desertata in officio praesenti praestitorum*.¹⁵ This volume has not been used so far by historians, even though it presents a treasure trove for the social-economic history of Red Ruthenia. Apart from the aforementioned source, two valuable series of *iuramenta* are also entered in two other volumes, containing the declarations recorded at the castle court in Przemyśl between 27 September 1669 and 22 March 1670,¹⁶ and between 20 April 1661 and 18 August 1667,¹⁷ respectively. All these *iuramenta* origin from the time before the next great Tatar incursion of 1672, hence their study allows one to evaluate the economic conditions reigning in the Land of Przemyśl between the two large invasions of 1648 and 1672. In addition, two other quantitative sources have been used in the present study: the *iuramenta* recorded at the castle office in Przemyśl

Szczebrzeszyn w roku 1648', *Archiwariusz Zamojski*, iv (2005), 39–44; Jacek Bazak, 'Klęski elementarne i zniszczenia wojenne w dziejach "ziemi lubaczowskiej" w XVII wieku', *Rocznik Lubaczowski*, xiii–xiv (2004–6), 32–3.

¹⁴ The Latin term *abiurata* (Polonised as *abiuraty* in the plural) referred to the collective records of declarations, sworn under the oath (hence the Latin term *iuramenta*, referring to these declarations) by the owners, whose properties (fields and households, including those belonging to subject peasants, mills, inns, fulling mills, sawmills, artisan shops, etc.) had been destroyed by the invaders. The declarations were sworn and recorded in order to obtain tax exemptions.

¹⁵ Lvov, Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine [hereafter: TsDIAL], *Castronsia Premisliensia* [hereafter: CP], fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, pp. 356–1096.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, vol. 1070, pp. 351–614.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, vol. 1071, pp. 1–392.

between 28 January and 22 April 1653,¹⁸ and the tax register for the Land of Przemyśl, composed in 1651.¹⁹ The information contained in the above sources formed a basis for detailed calculations, regarding the material and demographic losses suffered by the region in the autumn of 1648. A complete statistical overview, including the data on single villages, has already been published by the present author in a series of tables in 2009.²⁰

Notwithstanding such obvious advantages of *iuramenta* for historical research as their massive character, uniformity, even territorial dispersion and representativeness (they contain information regarding various types of landed property: the royal domain, noble estates, urban and Catholic and Orthodox church property), meticulousness, high frequency of declarations and the resulting actuality of the declared *status quo*, like in the case of other sources produced for fiscal reasons, they cannot be entirely trusted.²¹ For instance, the data regarding material losses were often entered summarily, with no hint to the actual time and circumstances, in which they had been inflicted. The owners often combined the fresh losses suffered from the invasion of 1648 with those inflicted much earlier, for instance during the Tatar incursions of the 1620s. To reduce the influence of

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, vol. 1075, pp. 29–43.

¹⁹ Biblioteka Czartoryskich w Krakowie (hereafter: BCz), ref. no. 1728 III: Regestrum contributionum viginti quinque in quatuor ratas divisarum per generosos Georgium Madaliński pocillatorem vielunensem septem, Valentinum Fredro sex, Andream Zerek sex, Stanislaum Sieniński sex, exactorum Anno Millesimo Sexcentsimo Quinquagesimo Primo, pp. 1–75. Another copy has been preserved in volume 1075 of the acts of the castle court in Przemyśl (TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1075, pp. 57–158).

²⁰ See Andrzej Gliwa, 'Najazd tatarsko-kozacki na Ruś Czerwoną w 1648 r. Straty materialne i demograficzne na terenie ziemi przemyskiej', *Rocznik Przemyski*, xlv, 1: *Historia wojskowości* (2009), 63–120 (annex entitled 'Wykaz wsi ziemi przemyskiej spustoszonych podczas najazdu tatarsko-kozackiego w 1648 r. wraz z obiektami zniszczonymi oraz danymi o ilości ofiar śmiertelnych, wysokości jasyru i liczbie zrabowanych zwierząt').

²¹ So far, in the Polish historiography there has been a prevailing opinion on the low veracity of treasury documents, including *iuramenta*, and their limited use in the study of material losses related to warfare; see Witold Kula, *Problemy i metody historii gospodarczej* (Warsaw, 1963), 653; Zenon Guldon and Jacek Wijaczka, 'Zarazy a załudnienie i gospodarka Polski w dobie wielkiej wojny północnej', in Jadwiga Muszyńska (ed.), *Rzeczpospolita w dobie wielkiej wojny północnej* (Prace Instytutu Historii Akademii Świętokrzyskiej w Kielcach, 27, Kielce, 2001), 209.

such practice on the obtained results, and in order to distinguish the losses caused by the Tatar-Cossack invasion of 1648 from the losses caused by other factors, the method of intertextual analysis has been largely applied and the data contained in the *iuramenta* have been confronted with the data from other sources, such as tax registers, surveys of royal domains, or other series of *iuramenta* recorded in not too distant periods. The application of the cartographic method to the analysis of data from mass sources allows to reconstruct the routes of the Tatar-Cossack troops marches not only at the operational scale but also at a tactical level.

The conclusion of the Tatar-Cossack alliance, effected in mid-March (before 16 March) 1648, in Baghchesaray, in the presence of Khan Islam III Giray, was of crucial importance for the further political and military developments in the Ukraine.²² It seems that the khan's decision to enter the alliance with Chmielnicki was motivated not only by political factors, but also by the economic situation in the Crimea. In result of the prolonged civil war and the series of Cossack invasions in the 1620s, the Khanate's economy was in a deep crisis.²³ At the meeting at Baghchesaray, the khan's council made two important decisions. Firstly, it gave its consent to grant the Cossack request for a military assistance against the Commonwealth. Secondly, it turned down the Ottoman request to send Tatar auxiliaries to participate in the Ottoman war with Venice.²⁴ It is worth noting that Islam Giray

²² Larysa D. Pritsak, *Osnovni mizhnarodni dogovory Bogdana Khmel'nyts'kogo 1648–1657 rr.* (Kharkiv, 2003), 57; in the older Russian and Ukrainian historiography, the alliance between the Cossacks and the Crimean Khanate has been treated by such prominent authors as Smirnov and Hrushevskyi; see Vasilii D. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo pod' verkhovenstvom' Otomanskoï Porty do nachala XVIII veka* (St Petersburg, 1887), 539; Mykhailo Hrushevsky (also: Grushevs'kyi), *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, viii: *The Cossack Age 1626–1650*, ed. Frank Sysyn (Edmonton and Toronto, 2002), 397.

²³ Alan Fisher, 'The Ottoman Crimea in the Mid-Seventeenth Century: Some Problems and Preliminary Considerations', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, iii-iv, 1 (1979–80), 215–26.

²⁴ Omelyan Pritsak, 'Shche raz pro soyuz Bogdana Khmel'nits'kogo z Turechchynoyu', *Ukrains'kyi Arkeografichnyi Shchorichnyk*, N.S., 2 (1993), 180; see also Annex 1 on p. 188, containing the report of Tikhon Yergamishev from 30 March 1648, in which the Russian interpreter explained the reasons for the khan's refusal to assist the Ottomans in their war with Venice (curiously, the report refers to Malta rather than Venice) and narrated the conclusion of the Tatar-Cossack alliance against Poland-Lithuania.

entered the alliance with Chmielnicki without Ottoman consent.²⁵ The Tatar-Cossack agreement obviously violated the peace between the Porte and Poland-Lithuania, reconfirmed for the last time in 1640.²⁶ The most important article of the new treaty stipulated a military alliance between the Tatars and Zaporozhian Cossacks, which was to last forever. Of great importance for our further discussion on the Tatar-Cossack invasion of western Ruthenia was another article of the treaty, which regulated the behaviour of Tatar troops during the allied operations on the territory subject to Zaporozhian Cossacks as well as other territories of the Commonwealth, to which the Cossacks raised no claims. According to this article, the Tatars had no right to enslave Ruthenians (i.e., in the given context, Orthodox Christians), whereas they had the right to enslave Poles and Jews.²⁷ Other articles of military importance stipulated close cooperation and mutual exchange of intelligence information between the commanders of the allied troops. The Cossacks were to secure the Tatar march through Ukraine by guarding strategic passages such as river crossings.²⁸

After the successful campaign of the allied troops in the spring of 1648, the danger of a new Tatar-Cossack invasion of the Commonwealth was imminent, especially after the coup d'état in Istanbul and the dethronement of Sultan Ibrahim in early August 1648. The new Ottoman authorities, headed by Grand Vizier Sufi Mehmed Pasha, adopted a more hostile attitude towards the Commonwealth and supported the khan in his claims to be sent overdue customary gifts.²⁹

²⁵ Alekseĭ A. Novosel'skiĭ, *Bor'ba moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v pervoi polovine XVII veka* (Moscow, 1948), 395–6.

²⁶ The Ottoman-Turkish and Latin versions of the treaty of 1640 are published in Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th–18th Century): An Annotated Edition of 'Ahdnames and Other Documents* (The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage: Politics, Society and Economy, 18, Leiden, 2000), 458–70 (Doc. 46) and 471–5 (Doc. 47); on the Polish embassy to Constantinople in the year 1640, see *Wielka legacja Wojciecha Miaskowskiego do Turcji w 1640 r.*, ed. Adam Przyboś (Warsaw, 1985).

²⁷ *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy c Rossiei: dokumenty i materialy v trekh tomakh*, ii (Moscow, 1954), 24.

²⁸ Ivan S. Storozhenko, *Bogdan Khmel'nyts'kyĭ i voyenne mystetsvo u vyzvol'nŭ viĭni ukrains'kogo narodu sere diny XVII st.*, i: *Voyenni diĭ 1648–1652 rr.* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1996), 91.

²⁹ Warsaw, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Koronne Warszawskie, Dział turecki, teczka (folder) 399, no. 695; teczka (folder) 404, no. 701.

On 28 August 1648, the Crimean troops set out from Aq Mesdjid, the seat of *Qalga* Qırım Giray, who was appointed the head commander of the expedition. The Tatar cavalry marched through the Crimean isthmus (Perekop), crossed the Dnieper River at Tavan', and then crossed the Boh River at Koyun Gechidi (lit. 'sheep passage') and followed the Kuczmański (Kuchmanskyi) trail towards eastern Podolia. Having passed near Bar, Międzybóž (Medzhybizh), and Ożochowce (Ozhygivtsi), on 30 September the Tatars reached Jampol (Yampil'), where they were joined by a detachment of the Cossack army, headed in person by Bohdan Chmielnicki.³⁰ The commanders of the allied troops, assembled at a war council, decided to attack Lvov, the capital of the palatinate of Ruthenia.³¹ The route lay open due to the defeat and rout of the Crown troops at Piławce (Pylyavtsi; now Pylyava) on 22 September and the resulting panic flight of the noble militia and county troops from the battlefield.

On 5 October 1648, Tatar forays reached the neighbourhood of Lvov, while on the next day, the main Crimean army, headed by Qırım Giray, arrived.³² Having pillaged and set fire to the neighbouring villages, in the following days the Tatar and Cossack troops laid unsuccessful siege of Lvov, which took a large number of casualties.³³ In these circumstances, the Tatar commander resolved to regroup his troops and set a fortified camp (Tat. *koş*) in the village of Skniłów (Sknyliv), situated to the west of the city.³⁴ A decision to undertake a large pillage operation, whose effects were expected to break the enemy's morale, was reached on 12 October at a council attended by the *qalga* and other head Tatar commanders and dignitaries present in the camp.³⁵ Already earlier, troops headed by Mengli Giray Bey, the leader of the Shirin clan, had been dispatched to the south, in order to raid the Land of Halych. Now, the troops headed by Adil Mirza and Osman Chelebi were sent to the north, in the direction of

³⁰ Valerii A. Smoliĭ and Valerii S. Stepankov, *Bogdan Khmel'nits'kyi* (Kiev, 2003), 164.

³¹ Senai, *Historia*, 115.

³² LNSL, KO, ref. no. 2346, p. 35.

³³ 'Relacya o oblężeniu miasta Lwowa przez Chmielnickiego 1648 roku', ed. Aleksander Czołowski, *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, vi (1892), 544.

³⁴ Tomashivs'kyi, *Pershyi pokhid*, 42; see also BCz, Teki Naruszewicza (hereafter: TN), ref. no. 143 IV, no. 129, p. 576.

³⁵ Senai, *Historia*, 117.

the palatinate of Bełz, while an army headed by the nureddin, Ghazi Giray, was sent to the west, in order to pillage the Land of Przemyśl and the western part of the Land of Lvov.³⁶ The nureddin's cavalry, enforced by mounted Cossack auxiliaries, set out from the camp at Skniłów on 14 October.³⁷

Although the nobles from the Przemyśl and Sanok lands had been preparing for the combat since June 1648, the western part of the palatinate of Ruthenia was not ready to face such a massive Tatar invasion. In the second half of the year 1648, the district militia of the Przemyśl Land numbered 500 well armed soldiers.³⁸ Given the local circumstances, this was an impressive force, yet a helpless one in the face of the Tatar cavalry, numbering a few thousand raiders, mounting well bred and refreshed horses, reinforced by a Cossack contingent, and – perhaps most importantly – applying the asymmetric warfare tactics. Although Dariusz Kupisz, the author of a recent monograph devoted to the district militia in Little Poland and Red Ruthenia, positively evaluates the results of the militia activity during the 1648 campaign in the lands of Przemyśl and Sanok,³⁹ he has not taken into account the scale and results of the Tatar-Cossack operation, which in the second half of October 1648 affected ca. 70 per cent of the Land of Przemyśl.⁴⁰

We lack precise information concerning the route taken by the Tatar-Cossack troops. From the Crimean chronicle of Hadji Mehmed Senai we learn that the detachments which formed the western wing of the Tatar cavalry were sent towards Cracow.⁴¹ The main forces headed by Ghazi Giray followed the major local route of communica-

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

³⁷ Ludwik Kubala, *Oblężenie Lwowa w roku 1648* (Warsaw etc., n.d.), 66. The same date can be deduced from the Crimean chronicle by Senai; see Senai, *Historia*, 116.

³⁸ See Marcin Gawęda, 'Wysilek zbrojny ziemi przemyskiej i sanockiej w latach 1648–1649', *Rocznik Przemyski*, xli, 1: *Historia wojskowości* (2005), 90.

³⁹ Dariusz Kupisz, *Wojska powiatowe samorządów Małopolski i Rusi Czerwonej w latach 1572–1717* (Lublin, 2008), 327.

⁴⁰ Like the majority of Polish and Ukrainian historians who have written on the autumn campaign of 1648, Kupisz treats the land of Przemyśl as an area of marginal importance, situated at a distance from the main war theatre, far away from the main route used by the Tatar-Cossack army, and hence not exposed to a larger military danger; see *ibidem*.

⁴¹ Senai, *Historia*, 116.

tion, the so-called royal road, in the western direction, from Lvov towards Przemyśl.⁴² A cartographic analysis focused on the location of villages, affected by the Tatar-Cossack invasion in the district (*powiat*) of Przemyśl, allows one to conclude that the Tatar commanders concentrated their activity in the area situated to the south from the route connecting Lvov with Przemyśl. This area was much more densely populated than the forested area situated to the north from the said route.⁴³

Admittedly, the first village attacked by the allies was probably Bortiatyn (Bortyatyn), situated to the north from the main route, near the border between the lands of Lvov and Przemyśl, and invaded on 15 October 1648.⁴⁴ Nonetheless, the invaders' main effort was focused on the area to the south of the main route, where over 140 villages were raided. It is likely that such geographical division was *a priori* resolved by the Tatar commanders: while the areas to the north of the main route were to be raided by the detachments sent in the direction of towns: Jaworów, Tomaszów Lubelski and Zamość, the area situated to the south of the *strata regia* was assigned to the nureddin's army.⁴⁵ Both detachments met in the vicinity of the villages

⁴² Through Gródek, Sądowa Wisznia, and Mościska (Gorodok, Sudova Vyshnya and Mostys'ka). This route is depicted in detail on the Austrian eighteenth-century map prepared by a team headed by Colonel Friedrich von Mieg; see Vienna, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Kriegsarchiv, F. von Mieg, Karte des Königreichs Galizien und Lodomerien, 1:28800, 1779–1783, ref. B IX a. 390, section no. 206.

⁴³ Franciszek Persowski, 'Osadnictwo w dorzeczu średniego biegu Sanu. Próba rekonstrukcji krajobrazu z XV wieku', in *Studia z historii społecznej i gospodarczej poświęcone prof. dr. Franciszkowi Bujakowi* (Lvov, 1931), 96–7; Konstanty Jan Hładyłowicz, 'Zmiany krajobrazu w ziemi lwowskiej od połowy XV do początku XX wieku', in *ibidem*, map on pp. 110–11.

⁴⁴ TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, pp. 545–6.

⁴⁵ In the area bordering with the land of Lvov, the Tatars raided the villages of Dołhomościska (Dovgomostys'ka), Milatyn (Mylyatyn), Szolomieńce (Sholomynychi) and Beńkowa Wisznia (Ben'kova Vyshnya) (*ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 431, 442–3, 777; vol. 1071, pp. 221–2). One Tatar detachment, assisted by mounted Cossacks, marched to the south-west, towards Krukienice (Krukenychi). On its way, it attacked, among others, the villages of Dmytrowice (Dmytrovychi), Wołczyszczowice (Vovchyshchovychi), Podliski (Pidlisky), Ostróзец (Ostrozhets'), and the town of Krukienice (*ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 399–400, 405–6, 587, 591; vol. 1071, pp. 350–51). In Krukienice, the invaders destroyed 19 houses, of which 14 belonged to artisans. In a parallel to the said Tatar-Cossack detachment marched yet another one, which raided Nikłowice (Niklovychi), Milczyce (Myl'chytsi), Orchowice (Orkhovychi),

Knihynice (Knyagynychi) and Kropielniki (Kropyl'nyky).⁴⁶ Having regrouped, they continued their raid from this area, again divided into two detachments, each numbering a few hundred horsemen. One of these detachments turned to the west in the direction of Nowe Miasto (Nove Misto), while the other one entered the district of Sambor, bringing destruction and terror in its north-eastern part, where the invaders raided seven villages.⁴⁷

The remaining and largest part of the nureddin's army reached Mościska (Mostys'ka), and after having pillaged its suburbs⁴⁸ it turned to the south-west, towards the historical passage known as the Gate of Przemyśl (Pol. Brama Przemyska). In a fast march, the Crimean and Cossack troops reached Husaków (Gusakiv) and Niżankowice (Nyzhankovychi), aiming to bypass Przemyśl from the south. An important reason for this detour, in which the Tatar-Cossack combat group descended to the valley of the Wiar (Vihor) River, was the gathering of local militia near Medyka, where the local nobles assembled for inspection (so-called *okazowanie*).⁴⁹ During the fast march of the main army, already on 15 October, the Tatars assisted by the Cossacks raided a number of villages situated within 10 kilometers from the main route.⁵⁰ A group of Tatars detached from the main army and

Makuniów (Makuniv), Mokrzany Małe (Mali Mokryany), and Mokrzany Wielkie (Velyki Mokryany) on its way towards the border of the Sambor district (*ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 406, 428, 777, 783–4; vol. 1071, pp. 122–3).

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 368–9, 589.

⁴⁷ Barańcyce (Baranivtsi), Sadkowice (Sudkovychi), Rajtarowice (Raïtarovyvhi/Verkhivtsi), Brześciany (Berestyany), Bylice (Bylychi), Posada Nowomiejska (Posada Novomis'ka), and Błóżew Górna (Boloziv Gorishnii), *ibidem*, vol. 1071, pp. 48–50, 363–4; vol. 1075, p. 40.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 565, 632; vol. 382, p. 2117.

⁴⁹ Władysław Łoziński, *Prawem i lewem. Obyczaje na Czerwonej Rusi w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku*, i: *Czasy i ludzie* (Lvov, 1931), 358.

⁵⁰ They were the following villages: Zakościele (Zakostelee), Strzelczyska (Strilets'ke), Czyszki (Chyshky), Krysowice (Krysovychi), Buchowice (Bukhovychi), Radenice (Radenychi), Pnikut (Pnikut), Myślatycze (Myshlyatychi), Moczerady (Mocherady), Bolanowice (Bolyanovychi), Nowosiółki (Novosilky), and Bojowice (Bojevychi) (TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, pp. 356–8, 401, 405, 421–2, 432, 459, 631; vol. 1071, pp. 334, 403). Having set fire in Husaków, whose buildings were mostly constructed of wood (30 houses were destroyed; *ibidem*, vol. 1069, p. 606; vol. 1071, pp. 362–3; see also *Rejestr poborowy ziemi przemyskiej z 1651 roku*, ed. Zdzisław Budzyński and Kazimierz Przyboś [Polska południowo-wschodnia w epoce nowożytnej. Źródła dziejowe, i, 2; Biblioteka Przemyska, 33, Rzeszów

entered the northern part of the Przemyśl Heights (Pogórze Przemyskie). On 16 October, they reached as far as Bircza and devastated that small town.⁵¹

Precisely near Bircza, on 16 or 17 October 1648, a Polish foray, sent probably from Przemyśl to gather information, captured a Crimean Tatar named Khan Mehmed.⁵² During interrogation, the captive provided valuable information concerning the route of the Tatar army, its command structure, the military situation near Lvov, the general plan of operation realised by separate Tatar detachments, and the rules of cooperation between the Tatars and the Cossacks. He maintained that Tatar detachments were accompanied by Cossack units which, nonetheless, refrained from taking captives but focused on capturing goods.⁵³ He also explained that the Tatars from his detachment did not attack any town, but pillaged villages only, taking captives and goods.⁵⁴

The above statement sheds light on the character of cooperation between the Tatars and Cossacks. There must have been an agreement between respective commanders, regarding the assignment of military targets during the raid of the Land of Przemyśl. It probably stipulated that the Tatars would raid rural areas whereas the Cossacks would concentrate on conquering towns. To be sure, when a given town was taken, both the Cossack and Tatars would participate in its pillage, as is evidenced by primary sources. Even a superficial knowledge of the tactics and equipment, adopted and favoured by the two allies, suggests that such a division of tasks perfectly fitted the character of

and Przemyśl, 1997], 6), the allies continued their march towards Niżankowice unrestrained, having reached the valley of the Wiar River near Cyków (Tsykiv) (TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, pp. 380–3, 424, 492).

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, vol. 1071, pp. 251–2, 378–9.

⁵² BCz, TN, ref. no. 143 IV, no. 129, pp. 575–6. From his confession one can assume that he belonged to the foray which had set out from Mościska and marched to the west in the direction of Bircza, in parallel with the main route leading from Lvov to Przemyśl.

⁵³ According to his confession, recorded by his interrogators in Polish, ‘among the Tatar [troops] there [we]re numerous Cossack banners, whose members capture[d] few people but rather herds of cattle, spoils, etc.’ (*Kozackich chorągwi w zagonach jest siła między tatarskimi, którzy ludzi mało biorą, tylko stada bydła, fanty etc.*); see *ibidem*, p. 575. Nonetheless, this statement suggests that at least some Cossacks did capture civilians who – it is worth stressing – must have been predominantly Ruthenian.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*.

both armies and allowed for an optimal use of their military potential. A statistical analysis of destructions, inflicted by the two allies in the Land of Przemyśl, proves that such a division was indeed adopted.

When the Tatars and Cossacks pillaged still larger territories of the Land of Przemyśl, the aforementioned assembly of local militia took place near Medyka. Although less numerous than the previous time, on 28 September 1648, when over 1000 nobles appeared for inspection, the gathering must have numbered a few hundred armed nobles. Yet, we lack any information on the efforts of the assembled nobles to face the approaching enemy. Having lost faith in an effective defense and feeling outnumbered, the nobles withdrew towards Przemyśl.⁵⁵ They did not stay there for long, but joined the wave of retreating troops and civil refugees in their flight further to the west.⁵⁶ In result, in the face of the most serious danger since 1620s, the territory of the Land of Przemyśl was practically defenseless. Few units of district militia which remained in Przemyśl could only passively observe the events, while their commanders could at most send forays in order to gather information on the actual position of the Tatars and Cossacks. Yet, these units were unable to defend even the closest vicinity of Przemyśl, not to mention the more distant areas of the district. Even the most distant, hardly accessible area of the district of Przemyśl, situated in the south-west in the Sanok-Turka Mountains (Pol. Góry Sanocko-Turczańskie) and the heights to the north of the Bieszczady Mountains, was not spared during the invasion. Having passed near Nowe Miasto, the Tatar-Cossack cavalry turned to the south and reached Chyrów (Khyriv), which did not withhold its attack.⁵⁷ Then, the Tatars divided their troops into smaller combat units and sent forays to the valley of the Strwiąż (Stryvivor) River and its tributaries. Their attack was detrimental for the colonisation of these mountain areas and resulted in the ruin of the villages Starzawa (Staryava) and Krościenko, situated in the Strwiąż

⁵⁵ Wrocław, Biblioteka Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich (hereafter: BOss.), ref. no. 496 II, p. 180.

⁵⁶ Archiwum Prowincji Polskiej OO. Dominikanów w Krakowie (hereafter: APPDK), ref. Pm 5: Liber continens compendiosam in hoc Conventu Praemisliensi Ordinis Praedicatorum Gestorum, Fundationem, Obligationem, Sepulturarum et aliarum rerum memoriam pro informatione ac aedificatione et posteritatis per F. Jacobu[m] Kołkieviciu[s] S.T.B. relictus Anno Domini 1647, p. 156.

⁵⁷ TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1071, pp. 363–4.

valley.⁵⁸ Having pillaged some villages⁵⁹ and reached the Świniński Forest, they returned.⁶⁰ In the meantime, other Tatar forays attacked the villages situated at the foot of the Kamienna Laworta Mountain.⁶¹ On the right bank of the Strwiąż River, the Tatars reached Bandrów at the border of the Sambor district.⁶² The invasion reached its furthest south-western extent when another Tatar foray reached the valley of the streams Jasiénka and Pastewnik, pillaging the villages situated at the foot of the Żuków ridge.⁶³

On 16 October 1648, in the vicinity of Chyrów, a large number of Tatar and Cossack troops assembled in order to undertake a large raid to the district of Sambor. The group, which numbered at least a few hundred cavalymen, marched from Chyrów towards Felsztyn (Fel'shtyn; now Skelivka), taking the route which passed on the left bank of the Strwiąż.⁶⁴ Thereafter, the Tatars turned to the south-east with the aim to enter the district of Sambor. While some of them attacked on their way the villages situated within the district of Przemyśl,⁶⁵ the remaining forces entered the district of Sambor and endeavoured to capture the district centre. Yet, the town of Sambor, defended by determined townsmen, withheld the attack. The Tatars only captured the suburbs where 40 houses were burned.⁶⁶ Also the town of Stara Sól (Stara Sil'), situated ca. 20 kilometers to the west of Sambor, did not escape the tragedy and was almost entirely consumed by fire.⁶⁷

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 511–12, 514.

⁵⁹ Łopusznica (Lopushnytsya), Katyna and Łopuszanka.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 513, 517–18, 611.

⁶¹ Wolica/Wola Korosteńska and Liskowate as well as Łodyna (*ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 511–12).

⁶² *Ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 412–13, 500, 513–14, 518, 570–71.

⁶³ Hoszów, Rabe, and Hoszowczyk, *ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 516–17.

⁶⁴ The villages of Stochynie (Slokhyni) and Grodowice (Gorodovychi) as well as the town of Felsztyn were taken on the spot and largely destroyed, *ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 438–9, 607, 635–6; vol. 1071, p. 353. In Felsztyn alone 35 houses were set on fire, of which 10 belonged to artisans; ten families of the local artisans (i.e., ca. 50 persons) were taken in captivity.

⁶⁵ Czaple (Chapli; now Novyi Kalyniv) and Humieniec (Gumenets').

⁶⁶ *Ibidem*, vol. 1071, pp. 116–18, 388–91; see also Aleksander Kuczera, *Samborszczyzna. Ilustrowana monografia miasta Sambora i ekonomji samborskiej*, i (Sambor, 1935), 306–7.

⁶⁷ Only nine houses survived the invasion, whereas 37 houses (i.e., 80%) were destroyed; 30 destroyed houses belonged to artisans and seven to other owners;

This was only the beginning of the fateful military operation, undertaken by the Tatar and Cossack troops in the district of Sambor. Its destructive results were incomparably larger than the results of each of the single Tatar raids which had affected the district in the 1620s. Nonetheless, the movements of the invading troops almost mirrored the routes taken by the nomads from Budjak in the autumn raid of 1629, commanded by the Nogay leader, Salman-shah Mirza.⁶⁸ This was probably not a coincidence but was rather caused by the fact that a number of Tatars, who had participated in the raid of 1629, also took part in the raid of 1648 and thus could share their experience and topographic knowledge.

Like in 1629, the major movements of the Tatar units in the district of Sambor went counterclockwise.⁶⁹ From their points of departure, situated on the lower Strwiąż River the Tatars headed southwards to reach the most highland part of the royal estate of Sambor (*ekonomia samborska*), situated in the Eastern Bieszczady Mountains. Having attained the main range of the Carpathian Mountains, the Tatars returned to the north and marched into the centre of the district. In the north-eastern part of the district, landscape and settlement patterns determined a slightly different movement of the invaders. They first moved southward to the valley of the Bystrzyca River, and then turned eastward, heading towards the northern part of the Drohobycz district.

Simultaneously with the attack on Sambor, the Tatars and Cossacks launched a series of raids in the northern and north-eastern part of the Sambor district, pillaging numerous villages along the valleys of the Dniester River⁷⁰ and of the stream Jabłonka.⁷¹ On 16 October, the invaders raided and partly burned Old Town of Sambor (Stare Miasto

see TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1071, pp. 356–7; see also *Rejestr poborowy ziemi przemyskiej z 1658 roku*, ed. Zdzisław Budzyński and Kazimierz Przyboś (Polska południowo-wschodnia w epoce nowożytnej. Źródła dziejowe, i, 3, Rzeszów and Przemyśl, 2000), 23.

⁶⁸ Gliwa, 'Jesienny najazd Tatarów', 105–42.

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, 124–5.

⁷⁰ Strzałkowice (Strilkovychi), Waniowice (Van'ovychi), Mrozowice (Morozovychi), Torhanowice (Torganovychi), Czukiew (Chukva), Bereźnica (Berezhnytsya), Torczynowice, Straszewice, Kobló Stare and Sozań, TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, pp. 378, 436, 446–7, 449–50, 505, 521–2, 616–17, 622.

⁷¹ Strzelbice (Stril'bychi), Bilicz (now Bilychi) and Wołoszynowa (now Voloshynovo), *ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 386, 485, 533–4.

Sambor, not to be confused with Sambor).⁷² Thereafter, the majority of the invading cavalry continued its march upstream the Dniester.⁷³ At the same time, smaller detachments raided the villages belonging to the royal estate of Sambor, situated to the west of the Dniester River,⁷⁴ and the villages dispersed in mountain valleys, situated on the left tributaries of the said river.⁷⁵ Having burned a few villages at the foot of the Magura Łomnińska,⁷⁶ the invaders entered the valley of the upper Dniester⁷⁷ and then moved to the valley of the Stryj River.⁷⁸ In the latter one, probably in the vicinity of the village of Turka, they met the units which had marched from Stare Miasto Sambor to the south, along the trail which followed the valley of the Jasienica stream.⁷⁹

Like in 1629, the area of the village of Turka in the valley of Stryj served as the basis for launching a second wave of incursions, directed against the farthest settlements of the royal estate of Sambor, situated in its southern mountainous area. In their march upstream along the Stryj valley, the invaders also pillaged mountain valleys created by the Stryj's left and right tributaries, spreading terror among their inhabitants.⁸⁰ One cavalry unit reached and pillaged Jaworów (Yavoriv), situated at the foot of the Ushok Pass.⁸¹ Other units raided settlements at the foot of the main range of the Eastern Bieszczady Mountains.⁸² An especially aggressive cavalry unit, mostly composed of the

⁷² 18 houses were set on fire during the attack; see *ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 990–91; cf. LNSL, KO, ref. no. 2389 II, p. 64; see also Igor Myts'ko, 'Starosambirshchyna. Istorychni etyudy', *Starosambirshchyna*, 2 (2002), 43.

⁷³ TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, pp. 367, 389–90, 459–60, 474.

⁷⁴ Terszów (Tershiv), Lenina Wielka (Velyka Linyňa), Nanczułka Wielka (Nanchivka Velyka; now Velykosillya), Nanczułka Mała (Nanchivka Mala; now Sosnivka), Tycha, *ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 370–71, 389, 392–3, 545.

⁷⁵ Hołowiecko, Grażiowa (Groz'ova), Płoskie, Mszaniec, Gałówka (Galivka), Lipie, *ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 372–3, 488–9, 492–3, 530, 603.

⁷⁶ Łopuszanka Lechnowa, Chaszczów (Khashchiv), Łomna (Limna), *ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 481–2, 492–3.

⁷⁷ *Ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 489, 546; vol. 1071, pp. 29–30.

⁷⁸ *Ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 673–4, 706.

⁷⁹ On their way to Turka, the invaders pillaged the villages of Łopuszanka Chomina, Jasienica Zamkowa, Wołosianka Wielka, and Rozłucz (*ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 399, 542, 546, 574–5).

⁸⁰ TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, pp. 415, 439–40, 457, 468, 495, 500–1, 525–6, 654–5, 810.

⁸¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 468–9.

⁸² *Ibidem*, pp. 499, 526, 530, 534.

Cossacks, operated on the right bank of the upper Stryj in the valley of the stream Zawadka, bringing much harm and damage.⁸³ Destruction also reached the settlements situated in the valley of the stream Dołżanka and the village of Zadziesko (Zadil's'ke).⁸⁴

The retreat of the Tatar-Cossack units from the southern, most highland part of the district of Sambor, probably began on 17 October, just like in the case of other detachments, operating in the Land of Przemyśl, which began their return march towards Lvov on the same date. This was in no way the end of the plunder operation in the district of Sambor, which was still subject to depredations by some cavalry units.⁸⁵ We lack exact information on the route taken by the retreating Tatar and Cossack forces, although one may assume that they followed eastwards the valley of Bystrzyca, and, having reached and crossed the Dniester, reached the vicinity of Mikołajów (Mykolaiv), situated in the Land of Lvov.

The north-eastern and central parts of the Sambor district were devastated by the Tatar-Cossack troops, which entered the district after having regrouped on 15 October in the vicinity of the villages Knihynice and Kropielniki. They devastated numerous villages situated on the left⁸⁶ and right banks of the Strwiąż River.⁸⁷ Having crossed the Dniester in the village of Kornalowice, the troops were divided into two autonomous cavalry units. The first one marched into the central part of the Sambor district, raiding the region of the middle and lower Bystrzyca River, and then moved to the central areas of the districts of Drohobycz and Stryj. The second one operated on the upper Dniester and then continued its march to the east, reaching the northern part of the district of Drohobycz and the north-eastern part of the district of Stryj. Having concluded their operation, both units left the district of Stryj and safely returned to the fortified camp at Skniłów, passing through Mikołajów and Pustomyty. To sum up, in their raid of the Sambor district, the first unit operated mainly along the Bystrzyca River,⁸⁸ while the second unit, which probably

⁸³ *Ibidem*, pp. 643–5, 649; vol. 1071, pp. 30–31.

⁸⁴ *Ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 469–70, 532, 642–3.

⁸⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 391–2, 464–7, 534–5, 647–8, 655–6, 661–2, 665–6, 678–9.

⁸⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 455–6, 462–3, 510, 601.

⁸⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 522, 530, 985.

⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 365, 372, 387–8, 404–5, 417, 424, 430, 471–2, 478–9, 481, 483, 485, 502, 520, 565, 656, 658; vol. 1071, pp. 56–7.

numbered a few hundred horsemen, operated in the marshy wetlands along the upper Dniester.⁸⁹

The same two units raided the north-eastern part of the district of Drohobycz,⁹⁰ but the latter district had been much more seriously affected by the raids of the troops, which had earlier operated in the central and north-eastern parts of the district of Sambor. The Tatar-Cossack troops moved along two principal routes. In the north, they crossed to the right bank of the Trudnica River and raided the northern, and then the central parts of the district.⁹¹ Interestingly, the invaders resigned from attacking the town of Drohobycz, although they raided its suburbs.⁹² The district centre was only attacked a few weeks later by the Cossacks retreating from the siege of Zamość, who found local support among the revolted Ruthenian townsmen.⁹³ The second route used by the invaders led from Niedźwiedza (Medvezha) in the Sambor district through Uniatycze (Drohobycz district) and Lisznia (again Sambor district).⁹⁴ The troops which entered by this route joined the troops already engaged in raiding the northern and central parts of the Drohobycz district.⁹⁵

On 17 October, the Tatar-Cossack troops moved further to the south and entered the district of Stryj. Probably the first units were those which one day earlier had raided the north-eastern part of the district of Drohobycz. The invaders operated along the Stryj River⁹⁶ and their commanders felt so secure that they decided to attack even the district centre, the town of Stryj.⁹⁷ Given the topography of

⁸⁹ Where it destroyed Bilina Wielka, Tatary, Ortynice and Łąka (Luka), *ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 476, 547, 549; vol. 1071, p. 307.

⁹⁰ *Ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 408–9, 419–20, 478, 484, 583, 751; vol. 1071, pp. 63–4, 66–7.

⁹¹ *Ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 420, 431, 486, 508, 527, 636, 637, 641–2, 791–2; vol. 1071, pp. 178–9.

⁹² *Ibidem*, vol. 1071, p. 235.

⁹³ Yaroslav D. Isayevich, *Gorod Drokhobych v 16–18 vv.* (Lvov, 1960), 14; see also Przemysł, Archiwum Archidiecezjalne (hereafter: AAP), MS 157, pp. 1295–6, 1298.

⁹⁴ TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, pp. 421, 540–41.

⁹⁵ *Ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 429–30, 636–7.

⁹⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 374–5, 398, 440–41, 444–5, 502–3, 551, 584–5; vol. 1071, p. 106.

⁹⁷ *Ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 514–15; Rejestr poborowy ziemi przemyskiej z 1658 roku, 12. The invaders who broke into the town set 132 buildings on fire (100 wooden buildings, 26 houses belonging to artisans and six other buildings) and robbed the townsmen's belongings.

destructured localities, the Tatars probably approached Stryj from the west.⁹⁸ One foray entered the valley of the stream Stynawka,⁹⁹ while other units raided the valley of the middle Stryj.¹⁰⁰

Having concluded the raid of the Drohobycz and Stryj districts, probably on 18 October, the Tatar and Cossack troops began their return towards the camp near Lvov. Convoys loaded with spoils and escorting thousands of captives headed towards Mikołajów, where they had to cross the Dniester. While the town was set on fire and its neighbourhood destroyed, the Tatars returning from the districts of Stryj and Drohobycz were joined by those returning from the Land of Halych and the southern part of the Land of Lvov (especially the district of Żydaczów), commanded by the Shirin bey, Mengli Giray. Together, the invaders returned unharmed to the camp at Skniłów.

Almost simultaneously, the Tatar-Cossack troops which had raided the district of Przemyśl began their return. On 17 October, the Tatar cavalry, escorting captives, cattle, horses, and other spoils, passed near Przemyśl.¹⁰¹ The author of the chronicle of the Dominican monastery in Przemyśl recorded that on that day 'terror maximus ac horror in Civitate eadem Premisliensi factus'.¹⁰² The townsmen helplessly observed from the walls the Tatars conveying their prey and the fires set in surrounding villages.

Both the Tatar and Cossack troops which had assaulted the district of Przemyśl and those which had raided the districts of Drohobycz and Stryj returned to the camp at Skniłów by 19 or 20 October. The Crimean chronicler, Hadji Mehmed Senai, recorded that the returning troops were loaded with precious spoils and escorted a great number of captives.¹⁰³ Although Senai often exaggerated, in this case his description was true. The number of captives kidnapped during the raid in October 1648 was one of the largest in the history of the Tatar incursions on the territory of Commonwealth.

At the end of the second decade of October, the north-eastern part of the Land of Przemyśl was entered by a Tatar unit which had earlier

⁹⁸ TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, pp. 374, 791–2.

⁹⁹ *Ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 373–4, 791–2.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 373, 375, 484, 519–20, 595; vol. 1071, pp. 146–7.

¹⁰¹ APPDK, ref. Pm 5, p. 156.

¹⁰² APPDK, ref. Pm 1: *Historia Conventus Premisliensis Ordinis Praedicatorum Provinciae Poloniae in Russiae horis Palatinatu Fundati circa Annum 1240*, p. 74.

¹⁰³ Senai, *Historia*, 116.

raided the western part of the palatinate of Bełz. This was a small detachment of the army headed by Adil Mirza, earlier sent to raid the palatinate of Bełz. One foray, having passed through the forest complex of Puszcza Solska and crossed the Tanew River, attacked the villages of Łukowa and Różaniec, which belonged to Jan 'Sobiepan' Zamoyski.¹⁰⁴ On the left bank of the Tanew River, on the Tarnogród Plateau, the Tatars and Cossacks pillaged and burned the town of Tarnogród and three villages.¹⁰⁵ The furthest points to the west reached by the Tatars were the villages of Dąbrowica and Ożanna, situated to the east from the town of Leżajsk.¹⁰⁶ During the royal election, on 22 October, when the castellan of Chełm, Zbigniew Gorajski, and the castellan of Sieradz, Stefan Bogdański, alarmed the assembled nobles of the Tatars 'marauding with impunity near Leżajsk',¹⁰⁷ they clearly referred to the above two villages. Having altogether devastated seven villages and one town in the north-eastern part of the Land of Przemyśl, the Tatars and Cossacks quickly withdrew to the palatinate of Bełz, where they rejoined other troops in their return march towards Lvov.

Thus, the first phase of the pillage operation that was conducted in the Land of Przemyśl came to an end. Although quite short, lasting only four days (from 15 till 18 October), it brought catastrophic destruction in the area covering almost one-half of the Land of Przemyśl, and resulted in substantial demographic losses. The Tatar-Cossack troops devastated 155 villages in the district of Przemyśl and 205 villages in three other districts (of Sambor, Drohobycz and Stryj), altogether 360 villages, i.e., 84.7 per cent of the total number of villages that were affected by the autumn invasion of 1648. Moreover, it was not the last blow delivered by Tatar-Cossack invaders at the Ruthenian and Polish communities that inhabited the Land of Przemyśl.

¹⁰⁴ TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, pp. 429, 508–9, 595; Lublin, Archiwum Państwowe (hereafter: APL), Archiwum Ordynacji Zamoyskiej (hereafter: AOZ), sygn. 107: Inwentarz majątności zamechskiej po spustoszeniu przez nieprzyjaciela spisany die 3 Janua[ry] Anno D[omi]ni 1656, p. 53.

¹⁰⁵ Księżpól, Jastrzębiec and Luchów, TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, pp. 443–4, 555; vol. 1071, p. 188; APL, AOZ, ref. no. 68: Inwentarz miasta Tarnogroda, wsiow Xiężopola, Korchowa y Biszczy 1650 z roku, pp. 17–43.

¹⁰⁶ TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, pp. 436–7, 752.

¹⁰⁷ Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, *Pamiętnik o dziejach w Polsce*, iii: 1647–1656, trans. and ed. Adam Przyboś and Roman Żelewski (Warsaw, 1980), 128.

After all the units of the Tatar-Cossack army, which had participated in raiding the palatinates of Ruthenia and Belz, had returned to the camp at Skniłów, preparations began for a return march towards Moldavia. By the end of the second decade of October, the number of people taken into slavery from the territories of the above two palatinates might have attained tens of thousands. It is worth stressing that from the logistical point of view, the Tatar operation was of unprecedented size, incomparable with any raid undertaken in the previous decades of the seventeenth century. Its success was assured by the fact that the Tatars did not meet any resistance from the side of the Polish army. In Red Ruthenia, there was no cavalry unit able to stop and destroy the invaders, or at least to rescue the captives. The return march of the Crimean army began on 24 October and the convoy followed the Wallachian trail towards Moldavia.¹⁰⁸

On Wednesday 21 October, before the departure of the main Crimean forces from the camp near Lvov, a council was held with the participation of Tatar and Cossack commanders. It was resolved that the main Cossack army, assisted by Tatar detachments headed by Tughay Bey, the leader of the Arghın clan and the commander of Perekop, would be sent towards Zamość.¹⁰⁹ The Tatar troops, numbering approximately four thousand cavalymen, were to secure the march of Chmielnicki against Zamość. The main Cossack army set out from the camp near Lvov on 26 October and followed the trail to Zamość.¹¹⁰ In their vanguard marched the Tatar and Cossack units which had departed already in the morning of 24 October.¹¹¹ No later than on 25 October, having reached the vicinity of the town of Tomaszów, these units turned in the direction of the San River, heading towards Jarosław and Przemyśl.¹¹² This marked the beginning of the second phase of the pillage operation conducted in the Land of Przemyśl. It was targeted at the south-western part of the palatinate

¹⁰⁸ Senai, *Historia*, 117; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, viii, 490; Tomashivs'kyi, *Pershyy pokhid*, 67.

¹⁰⁹ Senai, *Historia*, 117.

¹¹⁰ They passed through Zboiska, Kulików (Kulykiv), Żółkiew (Zhovkva), Krechów (Krekhiv), Magierów, Potylicz (Potelych), Rawa Ruska and Narol, Tomashivs'kyi, *Pershyy pokhid*, 69.

¹¹¹ MrgHI, i: *Akty z r. 1648–1649* (FHU-R, iv, Lvov, 1898), 105–6.

¹¹² Jerzy Szornel to Primate Maciej Łubieński, Zamość, 25 Oct. 1648; BCz, TN, ref. no. 143 IV, no. 129, pp. 291–2.

of Bełz, and especially the eastern part of the district of Przemyśl, situated on the right bank of the San River. This area had been spared during the first phase of the invasion, which had taken place between 15 and 18 October. The Tatars and Cossacks, who participated in that operation, aimed at capturing possibly large numbers of captives.

The village of Mołodycz, situated at the border of the palatinate of Bełz, was probably the first settlement affected by the invasion.¹¹³ Next, the raiders pillaged the rich and populous estate of Jarosław, then divided among three owners (Anna Alojza Chodkiewiczowa, Jan 'Sobiepan' Zamojski, and Konstanty Jacek Lubomirski).¹¹⁴ Some units crossed to the left shore of the San River, probably near Jarosław, and continued their march to the west. The invaders captured the castle of Jarosław, solid but inadequately garrisoned, situated on the bank of the river. Then, they broke into the town.¹¹⁵ Jarosław had been deserted by the authorities and local patricians, so its defense was organised by commoners.¹¹⁶ After the Cossacks entered the town, negotiations began through the mediation of local Ruthenian townsmen.¹¹⁷ Having received the agreed ransom, the Cossacks left the town and joined other units which pillaged the neighbouring villages.¹¹⁸ We lack precise data on the destruction caused in Jarosław by the invasion.

The units, which operated near Jarosław, pillaged a number of villages situated to the west from the San River,¹¹⁹ and then invaded the region between Jarosław and Przemyśl.¹²⁰ On the basis of the

¹¹³ TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, p. 425.

¹¹⁴ The following villages were devastated on the right bank of the San River: Radawa, Cetula, Ryszkowa Wola/Wolica, Korzenica, Laszki, Wola Zaleska, Manasterz, Nielepkowice, Wiązownica, Piwoda/Morawin Staw, Makowisko, Szówsko and Surochów; see *ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 425, 452, 454–5, 461–2, 614–15, 1028–9.

¹¹⁵ 'Ulryk Werdum [Ulrich von Werdum]. 1670–1672', in Xawery Liske (ed.), *Cudzoziemcy w Polsce* (Lvov, 1876), 111; TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, pp. 156–7.

¹¹⁶ APL, AOZ, ref. no. 119, pp. 48–9.

¹¹⁷ Franciszek Siarczyński, *Wiadomość historyczna i statystyczna o mieście Jarosławiu ...* (Lvov, 1826), 93–4.

¹¹⁸ *Ibidem*, 94.

¹¹⁹ Munina, Kruhel Pawłosiowski, Tywonia, Ostrów, Morawsko, Kidałowice, Pawłosiów, Szczytna, TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, pp. 461–2, 687–8, 705; vol. 1071, pp. 155, 177, 207–8, 329–31.

¹²⁰ They pillaged Łowce, Rudołowice, Boratyn, Kaszyce, Drohojów, Ujkowice and Wyszatycze, TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, pp. 395–6, 461–2, 510, 619, 687–8, 705, 1054; vol. 1071, pp. 155, 177, 207–8, 254–5, 329–31; one foray entered

extant sources, we can conclude that the Tatar and Cossack cavalry reached even further to the west, devastating the village of Wola Niedźwiedza, situated a few kilometers to the south-west of Przeworsk, and the village of Tarnawka.¹²¹ It was probably the same cavalry unit which had earlier approached Przeworsk and withdrew from its walls only when its authorities had consented to pay a ransom.¹²² Tarnawka was the furthest point to the west reached by the allied cavalry during the autumn campaign of 1648, not only in the Land of Przemyśl, but in the whole of Red Ruthenia.¹²³

The units which had pillaged the lands of the estate of Jarosław on the right bank of the San River, later moved to the south-east, capturing slaves and pillaging the settlements on both sides of the Wisznia River.¹²⁴ The tragic fate was shared by the area neighbouring with the Land of Lvov, where several villages were set on fire.¹²⁵ The invaders also pillaged the villages to the east of the region called Gate of Przemyśl (Pol. Brama Przemyska), which belonged to the

the valley of the Mleczka Wschodnia and raided the village of Kramarzówka, *ibidem*, vol. 1070, p. 394.

¹²¹ *Ibidem*, vol. 1069, p. 617; vol. 1071, p. 190. The village belonged to the estate of Kańczuga, owned by Konstanty Jacek Lubomirski.

¹²² Aleksy Gilewicz, 'Przeworsk w okresie feudalnym i początkach feudalizmu', in Antoni Kunysz (ed.), *Siedem wieków Przeworska. Szkice, studia i materiały z dziejów miasta. Praca zbiorowa* (Rzeszów, 1974), 90.

¹²³ In the light of the sources analysed by the present author, one must reject the statement of Józef Półciwiarzek, according to which the Tatars had reached as far as Albigowa, a village situated only 4 kilometers to the south of Łańcut; cf. *idem*, 'Najdalszy zachodni pochód', 82. Półciwiarzek's conclusion was based on a note entered in the tax register for the land of Przemyśl, composed in 1651. The note indeed refers to the destruction of Albigowa by the Tatars, yet it does not provide any date. In fact, Albigowa had been destroyed much earlier, during the raid of the Budjak Tatars undertaken in June 1624. This fact was confirmed by the peasant's oath (*iuramentum*) recorded on 18 July 1648, i.e., three months before the Tatar-Cossack invasion that was to materialise in that year; see TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, p. 332.

¹²⁴ Among the villages raided in this region one can list Nienowice, Chotyniec, Hruszowice, Kalników, Starzawa (Staryava), Małnów (Malniv), Czerniawa (Cher-neva) and Sokola (Sokolya); see TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, pp. 406–7, 422–3, 429, 445–6, 451, 460, 637–8; vol. 382, p. 2116.

¹²⁵ Wola Gnojnicka (now Wola Glynys'tka), Gnojnice (now Glynys'tsi), Sarny, Przedborze (Peredvirye), Morańcze (now Mor'yantsi), Lubienie (Lyubini), Porudno and Porudeńko, *ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 423, 439, 456, 505–6, 717.

estate of Medyka.¹²⁶ The last settlements in the Land of Przemyśl, raided by the marching cavalry, were probably the villages of Roguzno (Rogizno) and Ożomla (Vizhomlya), situated at the border of the Land of Lvov.¹²⁷

On 28 October, the Tatar-Cossack units which had participated in the raid of the Land of Przemyśl, withdrew in the direction of Lvov, where they joined those Cossack troops which were still in the vicinity of the city. During the second phase of the pillage operation, which lasted from 26 till 28 October, the Tatar-Cossack units devastated 65 villages, i.e., 15.3 per cent of the villages that were affected by the autumn invasion, and two towns (Jarosław and Radymno).

This was not the last attack of the allies. On 26 October, when the main Cossack army, headed by Bohdan Chmielnicki, set out from Lvov towards Zamość, a Cossack corps headed by Lavrin Kapusta, the colonel of the Hadyach regiment, was dispatched to the west.¹²⁸ Its task was to raid the western part of the palatinate of Ruthenia (i.e., the western part of the Land of Lvov and the eastern and central parts of the Land of Przemyśl) and to rid it of the remnants of the Polish forces. In its slow westward march along the trail heading towards Przemyśl, at the end of October, the corps attacked Gródek, capturing both the town and the castle.¹²⁹ Having entered the Land of Przemyśl, the Cossacks attacked Mościska, robbing the houses of townsmen, plundering two Catholic churches, and desecrating the tombs, from which cadavers were removed.¹³⁰ The resigned town scribe who recorded these traumatic events melancholically commented on the invaders' behaviour by providing his note with the significant motto: *Nihil novi sub sole*.¹³¹

¹²⁶ These were Torki, Medyka and Szechynie (Shegyni); see *ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 447, 464, 629; vol. 382, p. 2116.

¹²⁷ *Ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 438, 505.

¹²⁸ Bogdan I. Sushyns'kyi, *Kozats'ki vozhdzi Ukraïny. Istoriya Ukraïny v obrazakh ii vozhdikh XV–stolit'* (Odessa, 2006), 492. See also Janusz Dąbrowski, 'Pochodzenie społeczne i drogi kariery wyższej starszyny kozackiej w latach 1648–1657', *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace Historyczne*, 101 (1993), 63; Volodymyr V. Kryvosheya, *Ukraïns'ka kozats'ka starshyna*, pt. 1: *Uryadnyky get'mans'koï administratsii* (Kiev, 2005), 202.

¹²⁹ MrgHI, i: *Akty z r. 1648–1649*, 128.

¹³⁰ TsDIAL, fond 35, op. 1: Księga aktowa urzędu wójtowskiego i rady miasta Mościsk (1588–1653), vol. 2, fol. 133v.

¹³¹ *Ibidem*.

Having left Mościska, the Cossack corps was slowly approaching Przemyśl and set a camp near Medyka. On 4 November, first Cossack forays appeared before Przemyśl, but were chased away by the armed militia composed of the inhabitants of its suburbs.¹³² The Cossack leaders tried to persuade the town authorities to pay ransom. Ivan Hyrya, the colonel of Bila Tserkva, and Ivan Volevach, the acting colonel of Chygyryn, promised in their letters, that the town and its belongings would not suffer any harm on the condition that the Cossacks 'be not refused bread for just one night'.¹³³ Yet, the town councilors rejected the offer, because its acceptance was equal to letting the Cossacks into the town, and letting them take victuals and other goods at will. In order to strengthen the defense, the town authorities resolved to destroy 32 houses built beyond the Castle Gate (Pol. Brama Grodzka), and cut down the trees in 25 orchards and gardens situated in the suburbs.¹³⁴ This was the evidence of determination on the part of the city council which decided to defend Przemyśl with no regard to the costs.

This time there were Polish troops in the neighbourhood of Przemyśl, capable of resisting the enemy. These were two district banners of Cossack cavalry (not to be confused with the Ukrainian Cossacks commanded by Chmielnicki), numbering 200 horsemen, and, above all, the private troops of Franciszek Karol Korniakt, the owner of the estate of Żurawica and some other estates in the Land of Przemyśl. The troops of Korniakt alone might have numbered 600 well armed and well trained hired soldiers.¹³⁵ In sum, the Polish troops numbered at least 800 soldiers and were additionally assisted by volunteers from among the local nobility and by armed peasants from the estates of Korniakt.¹³⁶

¹³² Leopold Hauser, *Monografia miasta Przemyśla* ([1883] 2nd edn Przemyśl, 1991), 127; Przemyśl, Archiwum Państwowe (hereafter: APPrz), Akta miasta Przemyśla, ref. no. 569, p. 83; MrgHI, ii: *Akty z r. 1649–1651*, 164.

¹³³ '... nie bronienia chleba przez noc telko', *Dopolneniya ko svodnoï galitsko-russkoï letopisi s' 1600 po 1700 god'*, ed. Antonii S. Petrushevich (Lvov, 1891), 263.

¹³⁴ MrgHI, ii: *Akty z r. 1649–1651*, 164.

¹³⁵ Natan Hannover, *Jawein Mecula*, in *Sprawy i rzeczy ukraińskie. Materyały do dziejów kozaczyzny i haydamaczyzny*, ed. Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński (Lvov, 1914), 51.

¹³⁶ See Lucjan Fac, 'Rok 1648', *Nasz Przemyśl*, 2008, no. 9, p. 7; Jerzy Motylowicz, *Spoleczeństwo Przemyśla w XVI i XVII wieku* (Rzeszów, 2005), 167.

On 6 November, the Cossack troops, headed in person by Colonel Kapusta, approached Przemyśl with the aim to take it by force.¹³⁷ On the same day, a battle took place in front of the town. In result, the Cossack forces were routed.¹³⁸ The soldiers of Korniakt captured a Cossack regimental banner, which was later donated as a *votum* in the Catholic cathedral in Przemyśl. Lavrin Kapusta was wounded in the battle¹³⁹ and the Cossacks were forced to retreat. In mid-November they joined the main Cossack army commanded by Chmielnicki, which was still besieging Zamość.

The retreat of the Cossacks from Przemyśl reduced the imminent peril in the central part of the district, but local risings of revolted peasants and Ruthenian townsmen continued, being occasionally supported by Cossack units which passed through a given area. Therefore, warfare of low intensity continued in the Land of Przemyśl until December 1648. Every few days, cavalry units were dispatched from Przemyśl for the reason of reconnaissance in the neighbouring regions. Such forays captured informants among the rioters and enemy troops, quelled local rebellions of Ruthenian peasants and sometimes skirmished with smaller Cossack units.

The last wave of the Tatar-Cossack incursions in the Land of Przemyśl was related to the retreat of the Cossack troops, returning after the siege of Zamość. In the second half of November, during the last phase of the siege and after its lifting on 24 November, the invaders marched back to the south-east, pillaging villages, noble manors, and sometimes even towns. In the attacks on towns, the Cossacks usually cooperated with local peasants and Ruthenian townsmen. One of the largest actions of this type took place in the last decade of November, when the Cossacks, assisted by the peasants from the Drohobycz *starosty*, attacked the town of Drohobycz. On 23 November, a large group of insurgents, numbering three thousand people and assisted by a Cossack detachment, stormed the town,¹⁴⁰

¹³⁷ APPDK, ref. Pm 5, p. 156; Hauser, *Monografia miasta Przemyśla*, 128.

¹³⁸ APPrz, Teki Leopolda Hausera, ref. no. 10, pp. 10–11.

¹³⁹ According to the Polish historians who wrote on the siege of Przemyśl, Kapusta had been killed in the battle; see Hauser, *Monografia miasta Przemyśla*, 127–8; Motylewicz, *Spółeczeństwo Przemyśla*, 167; Gawęda, 'Wysiętek zbrojny ziemi przemyskiej', 99; Fac, 'Rok 1648', 7. In fact Kapusta was rescued by his soldiers and managed to leave the battlefield; see BOss., ref. no. 496 II, p. 180.

¹⁴⁰ TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 376, pp. 300–3; Isayevich, *Gorod Drokhobych*, 14.

taking by assault numerous buildings, including the fortified parochial Catholic church of the Assumption.¹⁴¹ Having broken into the church's interior, the Cossacks massacred the people who sought shelter there, robbed and desecrated the temple.¹⁴² A local Orthodox priest, cooperated with the rioting peasants and even allowed them to store the robbed goods in the Orthodox church of the Holy Trinity.¹⁴³ After the Cossacks had left, the town remained in the hands of the riotous townsmen and peasants until the Polish troops, sent probably from Przemyśl, approached Drohobycz and restored order. It did not last long, because the town was again surrounded by the groups of rebellious Ruthenian peasants, numbering about two thousand and commanded by three townsmen from Drohobycz.¹⁴⁴ Taken again by the Ruthenian insurgents, the town remained in their hands until December, when the Polish soldiers stationing in Stryj finally dispersed the rioters.¹⁴⁵

After the main Cossack forces had evacuated the palatinates of Ruthenia and Bełz, the wave of popular riots in Red Ruthenia began to subside, but the social atmosphere was still very tense. In November and December 1648, there were many sporadic riots of Ruthenian peasants and townsmen directed against the nobles. Nonetheless, the majority of Ruthenian communities, tragically affected by the Tatar-Cossack raid, was not capable of massive risings in spite of radical moods reigning in the countryside. The people rather thought how to survive the approaching winter or how to rebuild the destroyed households. However, even in winter rioting Ruthenian communities attacked noble manors, although with a decreasing frequency.¹⁴⁶

During the Tatar-Cossack autumn incursion, which lasted with interruptions from 15 to 28 October, and during the raid against

¹⁴¹ AAP, MS 157, pp. 1295–6; TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 376, p. 302. See also Leonid Tymoshenko and Yaroslav Isayevich, 'Davnii Drohobych (XIV–XVIII st.)', in Leonid Tymoshenko (ed.), *Narysy z istorii Drohobycha (vid naïdavnishykh chasiv do pochatku XXI st.)* (Drohobych, 2009), 55–7.

¹⁴² AAP, MS 157, pp. 1298, 1320–21; Kuczera, *Samborszczyzna*, i, 305.

¹⁴³ TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 376, p. 302.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴⁶ E.g., on 22 February 1649, the peasants from Rzuchów (in the starosty of Leżajsk) raided Piskorowice, which belonged to Jan Zamoyski, see Józef Półciwarteł, *Położenie ludności wiejskiej starostwa leżajskiego w XVI–XVIII wieku* (Biblioteka Przemyska, 4, Warsaw and Cracow, 1972), 247.

Przemyśl, undertaken by the Cossacks of Colonel Lavrin Kapusta between 2 and 7 November 1648, at least 426 villages were ravaged altogether in the Land of Przemyśl, out of the total number of 931 (i.e., 45.8 per cent). The southern part of the district of Przemyśl along with the district of Sambor constituted the mostly affected area and the main target of the Tatar-Cossack invasion (see Tab. 1). The largest percentage of raided villages was recorded in the district of Drohobycz, where 39 villages were ravaged out of the total number of 49 (i.e., 79.6 per cent). Such a high percentage can be explained by the accessibility and small size of the district's territory. Moreover, it was raided by at least three Tatar-Cossack units, which operated from almost every direction. The location of the raided and destroyed villages in the Land of Przemyśl is presented on the attached map.¹⁴⁷

TABLE 1. *Damage to village and urban settlements during the Tatar-Cossack invasion of 1648*

District	Village settlements			Urban settlements		
	total number	destroyed number	(%)	total number	destroyed number	(%)
Przemyśl	602	220	36.5	26	10	38.5
Sambor	190	142	74.7	3	3	100
Drohobycz	49	39	79.6	1	1	100
Stryj	90	25	27.8	1	1	100
Total	931	426	45.8	31	15	48.4

During the invasion, the Tatar and Cossack troops entirely destroyed 34 villages, 24 of which were located in the district of Przemyśl, while the remaining 10 in three other districts. In most cases, the infrastructure of these villages was totally destroyed while the inhabitants, or at least their major part, were taken into slavery. Reconstruction and resettlement of such villages was especially difficult. In sum, the villages destroyed in their entirety constituted 8 per cent of the overall number of villages affected by the invasion.

The invasion of 1648 was the first one of such a scale in 19 years, since the memorable incursion of the Crimean and Budjak Tatars, undertaken in the autumn of 1629. Most villages affected by the raid

¹⁴⁷ This map has already been published as an attachment to the article by Gliwa, 'Najazd tatarsko-kozacki'.

of 1648 had not experienced Tatar raids for even a longer time. In the rural areas of the Land of Przemyśl, the loss in the agricultural production was tremendous. In the raided villages, the destroyed peasant farms comprised 2171 $\frac{2}{3}$ *łans* out of ca. 3378 arable *łans* recorded in these villages before the invasion (*łan* was a contemporary unit of land measurement), i.e., 64.3 per cent (see Tab. 2). The catastrophic destruction of the starosty of Drohobycz and the royal estate of Sambor, aggravated in the following months by the extortions of Polish troops wintering in these estates, persuaded King John Casimir to issue a decree in which he ordered the commanders of these troops to leave the deserted estates and not molest their inhabitants by further demands of food and fodder.¹⁴⁸

TABLE 2. *Damage to peasant farms and households during the Tatar-Cossack invasion of 1648*

District	Number of arable <i>łans</i> in full-sized farms			Cottager households			Households of landless peasants		
	extant	destroyed		extant	destroyed		extant	destroyed	
		number	(%)		number	(%)		number	(%)
Przemyśl	655 $\frac{1}{4}$	735 $\frac{1}{4}$	52.9	572	469	45.5	493	360	42.2
Sambor	397	1241 $\frac{1}{6}$	75.8	105	113	51.8	111	110	49.7
Drohobycz	84	133 $\frac{1}{4}$	61.3	21	75	78.1	13	41	75.9
Stryj	70 $\frac{1}{8}$	62	46.9	10	28	73.7	2	23	92.0
Total	1206 $\frac{3}{8}$	2171 $\frac{2}{3}$	64.3	708	685	49.1	619	534	46.3

If compared with other seventeenth-century invasions which affected the Land of Przemyśl, the invasion of 1648 was characterised by the highest extent of destruction of arable lands. For instance, the memorable Tatar raids of the years 1624 and 1626 caused in the Land of Przemyśl the destruction of 'only' 1495 $\frac{1}{3}$ and 1236 $\frac{7}{8}$ *łans*, respectively.¹⁴⁹ Hence, the destruction caused by the raid of 1648 was larger by ca. 30 per cent.

Along with the richer peasants (*kmiecie*) who cultivated full-sized farms in return for rent and labour, also the poorer strata among the peasantry – the cottagers cultivating smaller plots of land (*zagrodnicy*)

¹⁴⁸ For the document, issued in Cracow on 17 Feb. 1649, see TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 376, pp. 279–81.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Gliwa, 'Najazd tatarski', 48; *idem*, 'Zimowy najazd Tatarów', 24–5.

as well as the landless lodgers (*komornicy*) – suffered great losses due to the invasion. Out of 2546 households, belonging to the peasants of the two latter categories and situated in the affected area, as many as 1219 were destroyed (i.e., 47.8 per cent). The majority of these losses occurred in the district of Przemyśl (see Tab. 2).

Among the destroyed buildings, mills and inns merit special attention as their activity was related to food processing, hence their ruin affected the local economy both directly and indirectly. Out of 236 mills active before the invasion in the affected villages, 127 (i.e., 53.8 per cent) were destroyed. Inns were even more heavily affected. Out of 263 inns existing in the affected area, 170 were burned down (64 per cent) (see Tab. 3).

TABLE 3. *Damage to mills and inns during the Tatar-Cossack invasion of 1648*

District	Mills			Inns		
	extant	destroyed		extant	destroyed	
		number	(%)		number	(%)
Przemyśl	68	47	40.9	71	76	51.7
Sambor	30	50	62.5	19	73	79.3
Drohobycz	4	22	84.6	3	18	85.7
Stryj	7	8	53.3	–	3	100.0
Total	109	127	53.8	93	170	64.6

Like in the case of agricultural production, the most serious losses to mills and inns were recorded in the districts of Przemyśl and Sambor. This was due to the fact that the above two districts were characterised by the most dense settlement network. Over 80 per cent of all the mills and inns, destroyed in the Land of Przemyśl in 1648, were located in these two districts. The losses to mills and inns were much more serious than during the previous Tatar raids. To compare, in 1624, the Tatars destroyed 104 mills and 122 inns, while in 1626, 91 mills and 96 inns.¹⁵⁰

Another serious aspect concerned the massive loss in human dwellings, especially in the rural areas, where at least 5120 houses were set on fire, of which 4343 belonged to *kmiecie*, 685 to *zagrodnicy*,

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Gliwa, 'Najazd tatarski', 47–8, and *idem*, 'Zimowy najazd Tatarów', 23–4.

52 to rural artisans, and 40 to the owners of unknown social status.¹⁵¹ Besides, 568 houses were destroyed in towns. In consequence, over 30 thousand people in the Land of Przemyśl became homeless in the face of approaching winter. Over 51 per cent of the destroyed rural houses were located in the district of Sambor (2647 houses, of which 2482 belonged to *kmięcie*, 113 to *zagrodnicy*, 12 to rural artisans, and 40 to the peasants dwelling in Przedmieście Samborskie, whose precise social status cannot be determined). Slightly less destruction was experienced by the inhabitants of the district of Przemyśl, where the invaders destroyed 1976 houses (1470 belonging to *kmięcie*, 469 to *zagrodnicy*, and 37 to artisans), i.e., 38.6 per cent of the rural houses destroyed in the entire Land of Przemyśl. Altogether, as much as 4623 destroyed houses, i.e., 90.3 per cent of the rural houses destroyed in the Land of Przemyśl, were located in the above two districts.

The total number of destroyed buildings in the rural areas also comprised at least a dozen of thousands of barns, cowsheds, etc. The owners usually mentioned their destruction in the *iuramenta*, but, unfortunately for a present scholar, they did not provide any detailed numbers. Also a number of noble manors fell victim to the incursion, although we know some details in regard to only two such cases.¹⁵² Still, in the light of available data the losses in noble manors were less substantial than in peasant villages. Apparently the nobles were able to defend their houses against the invaders more effectively.

Interestingly, substantial losses affected the property of the Orthodox Church in the Eparchy of Przemyśl – 32 Orthodox churches and 86 households of Orthodox priests were robbed or set on fire.¹⁵³ These data put in question the opinion voiced by some Ukrainian historians, according to which the Cossacks spared the property of the Orthodox Church. In the Ukrainian historiography, the problem of war destructions caused by the Tatar-Cossack troops in the area, whose many inhabitants belonged to the Orthodox church, has been typically covered with silence. Some Ukrainian historians openly

¹⁵¹ We only know that these houses were situated in the suburbs of Sambor (Pol. Przedmieście Samborskie).

¹⁵² In Wola Gnojnicka, the Tatar-Cossack troops set the mansion of Samuel Bolestraszycki on fire, while in Topolnica (the district of Sambor) – the mansion of Andrzej Kopystyński, TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, pp. 439, 441, 591.

¹⁵³ See Gliwa, 'Najazd tatarsko-kozacki', 63–120 (annex).

denied that the Cossacks had devastated Orthodox churches during the autumn campaign of 1648. In an article published in 1998 by Valerii Smoliï and Valerii Stepankov, two Ukrainian historians who have spent numerous years on studying the Chmielnicki uprising, the authors put in question the veracity of the reports, according to which the Cossacks had robbed many Orthodox churches and had attacked the Church of St George in Lvov during the siege of the city.¹⁵⁴ In fact, there is ample evidence of the Cossack participation in destroying the property of the Orthodox and Uniate Churches in the palatinates of Ruthenia, Betz, Volhynia, Podolia, and Braclaw during the autumn campaign of 1648.¹⁵⁵

Serious material losses were witnessed in the towns of the Land of Przemyśl. Out of 31 towns existing in this province in the mid-seventeenth century, as many as 15 were raided (i.e., 48.4 per cent): ten in the district of Przemyśl,¹⁵⁶ three in the district of Sambor,¹⁵⁷ one in the district of Stryj (Stryj),¹⁵⁸ and one in the district of Drohobycz (Drohobycz¹⁵⁹).

The invasion of the Land of Przemyśl also caused great demographic losses. Contemporary Tatar sources stress the large number of captives, taken in Red Ruthenia during the autumn campaign of

¹⁵⁴ Valerii A. Smoliï and Valerii S. Stepankov, 'Ukrains'ka natsional'na revoliutsiia 1648-1676 rr. Kriz' pryzmu stolit', *Ukrains'kyï istorychnyi zhurnal* (1998), no. 3, pp. 3-4.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Antoni Mironowicz, *Prawosławie i Unia za panowania Jana Kazimierza* (Dissertationes Universitatis Varsoviensis, 443, Białystok, 1997), 87.

¹⁵⁶ Chyrów (TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1071, pp. 363-4; vol. 1075, p. 40); Bircza (*ibidem*, pp. 251-2, 378-9); Felsztyn (*ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 635-6; vol. 1071, p. 353); Husaków (*ibidem*, vol. 1069, p. 606; vol. 1071, pp. 362-30); Jarosław (*ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 156-7; vol. 1071, pp. 369-70); Krukienice (*ibidem*, vol. 1069, p. 587; vol. 1071, pp. 350-51); Mościska (TsDIAL, fond 35, op. 1: Księga aktowa urzędu wójtowskiego i rady miasta Mościsk (1588-1653), vol. 2, fol. 133v; TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, p. 561; vol. 1071, pp. 354-6); Niżankowice (*ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 987-8); Radymno (*ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 575-6; vol. 1071, pp. 367-8); Tarnogród (*ibidem*, vol. 1071, p. 188; APL, AOZ, ref. no. 68: Inwentarz miasta Tarnogroda, wsiow Xiężopola, Korchowca y Biszczy z 1650 roku, pp. 17-64).

¹⁵⁷ Sambor (TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 1069, pp. 116-18; vol. 1071, pp. 388-91); Stara Sól (*ibidem*, vol. 1071, pp. 356-7); Stare Miasto Sambor (*ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 990-91).

¹⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, vol. 1069, pp. 514-15; vol. 1075, p. 43.

¹⁵⁹ AAP, MS 157, pp. 1298, 1320-21; TsDIAL, CP, fond 13, op. 1, vol. 376, pp. 300-3.

1648.¹⁶⁰ There is probably not much exaggeration in the words of the Crimean chronicler Senai, who wrote that the Tatars

returned with such vast spoils that even a most petty Tatar camp-follower regarded a number of thirty or even forty captives as nothing of great value.¹⁶¹

The contemporary Ruthenian Eyewitness Chronicle (*Litopys Samovydtsa*) confirms that in the autumn of 1648 the Tatars abducted great numbers of Polish, Ruthenian, and Jewish captives.¹⁶² On the basis of the sources analysed by the present author, at least 8794 people were enslaved only in the Land of Przemyśl¹⁶³ (see Tab. 4). The above statistics are certainly incomplete, because in many cases the numbers of abducted captives were not given. One can estimate that the total number of captives abducted from the Land of Przemyśl exceeded 10,000 people. The sources also record 47 people killed during the invasion.

TABLE 4. *Number of people killed, captives, and stolen animals during the Tatar-Cossack invasion of 1648*

District	People		Stolen animals			
	killed	captives	horses	cattle	oxen*	sheep
Przemyśl	43	6073	1927 (and 32 herds)	260 (and 27 herds)	469 (and 6 herds)	–
Sambor	4	2360	443 (and 13 herds)	286 (and 20 herds)	119 (and 2 herds)	60
Drohobycz	–	303	3 herds	2 herds	–	–
Stryj	–	58	1 herd	1 herd	–	–
Total	47	8794	2370 and 49 herds	546 and 50 herds	588 and 8 herds	60

* The distinction of stolen oxen corresponds to the sources data

¹⁶⁰ Osman N. Akchokrakly, 'Tatrs'ka poema Dzhan-Mukhamedova pro pohid Islyam-Gireya II spil'no z Bogdanom Khmel'nyts'kym na Pol'shu 1648–1649 rr. (Za rukopysom z materialiv etnografichnoï ekspedytsii Kryms'kogo NKO po Krymu vlitku 1925 roku)', *Ckhidnyï svit*, 1930, no. 3, p. 168; Senai, *Historia*, 116.

¹⁶¹ Senai, *Historia*, 116.

¹⁶² *Litopys Samovydtsa*, ed. Yaroslav I. Dzyra (Kiev, 1971), 54.

¹⁶³ For detailed data concerning the number of captives abducted in the land of Przemyśl in 1648, see Gliwa, 'Najazd tatarsko-kozacki', 63–120 (annex).

To sum up, the Tatar-Cossack invasion of the Land of Przemyśl, effected in the autumn of 1648, lasted altogether only 10 days but caused enormous destruction and material losses. The largest concentration of damage was recorded in the district of Sambor and the southern and eastern parts of the district of Przemyśl. Less affected was the district of Stryj, where only the north-east and central parts were raided. The invasion of 1648 constitutes a turning point in the economic history of the Land of Przemyśl, the best developed and the richest part of Red Ruthenia. The invasion brought a definite end to the prosperity and dynamic growth experienced by this region since the fourteenth century. Already weakened by the series of Tatar raids in the 1620s, the local economy was unable to make up for the losses experienced in 1648 until the second half of the eighteenth century.

If compared to the previous Tatar military operations, which had affected the Commonwealth before the Chmielnicki rising, the Tatar-Cossack invasion of 1648 was of unprecedented dimensions, both militarily and politically. Neither the political leaders, nor the highest military commanders of the Commonwealth were able to face and effectively stop the aggressors. In result, great material and demographic losses affected over one-third of the state's territory bringing a serious decrease of the Commonwealth's prestige. It is worth reminding that the invasion took place in the political circumstances which were highly unfavourable for the Commonwealth: the interregnum in Poland-Lithuania and the indifference of Istanbul and Moscow towards the Cossack-Tatar alliance provided optimal conditions for the invaders. The alliance between the Tatars and Cossacks also proved very effective from the military aspect. The Tatar cavalry and Cossack infantry, operating in liaison, turned out to be a formidable enemy for the Polish Crown army, especially after this army had been deprived of commanders when both Crown hetmans had been taken prisoners in the battle of Korsuń. In result, the Commonwealth found itself in a critical situation. This situation could be only compared to the one from 1672, when the Commonwealth was to face alone the whole Ottoman might, in addition assisted by the Tatars and Cossacks led by Petro Doroshenko. Even then, however, the Commonwealth did not experience an interregnum and the Crown hetmans were present in the army. Moreover, the social atmosphere among the inhabitants of the affected territories was much less tense in 1672, so – unlike in 1648 – the Commonwealth's forces did not have to face a rebellion

of a part of the royal subjects (apart from the Cossacks) that would even further weaken the defense.

The success of the Cossack military operations would not be possible without the Tatar assistance. One can only agree with Ivan Storozhenko, a Ukrainian historian, who states that the assistance of the Crimean Khanate was decisive for the success of the Cossack uprising.¹⁶⁴ Without the Crimean-Cossack treaty and the successive aid of the Tatar armies, the uprising of Bohdan Chmielnicki would have probably shared the fate of the previous Cossack rebellions, quelled by the Commonwealth's troops. Whereas the first two Tatar expeditions reflected the internal competition within the Crimean establishment and the ambitions of the Shirin clan to raid the Commonwealth, the third and largest expedition was made possible by the coup d'état in Istanbul, which took place in early August. The new Ottoman administration, having disposed of Sultan Ibrahim and his grand vizier, Ahmed Pasha, gave a *carte blanche* to Khan Islam III Giray to prepare and launch a full scale plundering and slave raid. Given the resulting terrible devastation in the south-eastern provinces of the Commonwealth and the traumatic experience left in the memory of local inhabitants, mostly composed of Ruthenians, the role of Bohdan Chmielnicki in this raid and the assistance provided by the Cossacks to the Tatar slavers can be hardly explained if one sticks to the view, presenting the Cossacks as the defenders and representatives of the Ruthenian nation. If it were so, why would the Cossacks have joined the action that could be justly described as a self-invasion? In the opinion of the present writer, the behaviour of the Cossack troops in Red Ruthenia, depicted by the sources analysed in this study, rather suggest that Bohdan Chmielnicki and other Cossack elders regarded the Red Ruthenian lands as an alien territory, notwithstanding their political declarations.¹⁶⁵

trans. Dariusz Kołodziejczyk

¹⁶⁴ Storozhenko, *Bogdan Khmel'nyts'kyi*, i, 91–3.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. *Litopys Samovydsa*, 53–4.