

Theodore R. Weeks

Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

Petersburg on Ukraine: Logic and Folly of Imperial Policy, 1863–1915

Petersburg o Ukrainie: logika i szaleństwo polityki imperialnej (1863–1915)

Abstract: The paper delves into the complex relationship between Ukraine and the Russian imperial government, a topic of significant historical and geopolitical importance. Ukrainians, the second-largest ethnic group in the Empire, were often dismissed as a ‘non-nation’ due to their cultural proximity to Russia. This study outlines St Petersburg’s contradictory policy towards its Ukrainian subjects in the final half-century of the Russian Empire.

Abstrakt: Artykuł prezentuje złożone relacje między Ukrainą a rosyjskim rządem imperialnym, temat o dużym znaczeniu historycznym i geopolitycznym. Ukraińcy, druga co do wielkości grupa etniczna w Imperium, byli przez Rosjan często odrzucani jako “nie-naród” ze względu na ich kulturową bliskość z Rosją. Niniejsze studium przedstawia sprzeczną politykę Petersburga wobec ukraińskich poddanych w ostatnim półwieczu istnienia Imperium Rosyjskiego.

Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, imperialism

Słowa kluczowe: Rosja, Ukraina, imperializm

Recent events, and in particular the crass aggression carried out by Russia on Ukraine since February 2022, suggest the value of a review of past relations between the imperial centre and the Ukrainian borderlands in the pre-1917 period. Official Russia always denied the existence of any policy of Russification in the sense of a total obliteration of other linguistic or cultural groups. At the same time, St Petersburg always refused to admit the existence of the Ukrainian or Belarussian nations. For the Russian Empire, these two ethnic groups were mere ‘branches’ of the one Russian nation. Following this logic, Russians could claim to make up over half (nearly two-thirds) of the Empire’s population according to the census of 1897. Without the Ukrainians and Belarussians, this percentage falls below half.

The importance of the Ukrainian question grew progressively from the turn of the century, and by 1914, it constituted one of the most troubling problems for the continued existence of the Empire. In my research, however, I have been able to find little concern with either Ukrainians *per se* or with the “Ukrainian question” among tsarist administrators in Right-Bank Ukraine in the period 1894–1914. In this short essay, I will attempt to present my findings.¹

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Imperial Russia’s overall policy toward the Ukrainians around the turn of the century is the general refusal of the Russian government to recognize the Ukrainians as a nationality separate from Russians and Belarussians. While the Russian government certainly did take brutal measures against any attempt to foster the language and culture of Ukraine, on the whole, it is my impression that the Russian government was little concerned, relatively speaking, with the “Ukrainian danger” and regarded the Ukrainian (*malorusskii*) masses not as potential enemies (at least on the “national” level), but as allies against more immediately threatening forces, most especially the Jews and Poles. In this discussion paper, I would like to develop this thesis and offer possible explanations for what I have termed “a deafening silence”.

Before plunging into my argument, certain caveats and explanations are in order. First, this paper aims to raise issues and problems, not to solve them definitively. Second, the data upon which my argument is based are pretty scarce and “specific”: it may well be that, viewed from another angle, a quite different picture would arise. Still, the existence of regional variety within Ukraine is itself a topic worthy of our attention. My archival research has been limited to the three southwest provinces of Kiev, Podolia and Volhynia, mainly during the reign of Nicholas II, and particularly in reference to the Western Zemstvo project during that period.² This region differed from Eastern Ukraine in the high percentage of Jews, Poles, and even Germans and Czechs who lived here. These three provinces were grouped into one administrative unit under the governor-general of Kiev. Besides these three provinces, my

¹ For two very different arguments on perceptions of Ukrainians in the Russian Empire, see A. Miller, *The Ukrainian Question*, Budapest 2003; and F. Hillis, *Children of Rus’: Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian Nation*, Ithaca 2013.

² According to the census of 1897, by far the majority of the population of the Southwest was made up Ukrainians. The exact percentages of the total population by province are: Volhynia 70.1%, Kiev 79.2%, Podolia 80.9%. Ukrainians also made up a significant part of the population of neighboring Grodno province (22.6%). Computed from figures found in *Первая всеобщая перепись населения Российской империи, Общий свод* (Санкт-Петербург 1905), vol. 2, p. 20. More generally, see T. Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914*, DeKalb 1996.

research has also dealt with the region beyond the Bug River to the West, the so-called “Kholm area”, where several hundred thousand Ukrainians made their home. This area is particularly interesting because of the unique religious position of the Ukrainian population here: this was the last remaining Uniate congregation in the Russian Empire after 1839, and these Uniates were then “united” with the Russian Orthodox Church by government edict in 1875.³ It is also this “Russian” population that the imperial government aimed to “protect” by forming the Kholm province in 1912.

In this region, the imperial government saw its foremost enemy in the Polish land-owning class. This was, after all, the group that had risen up against the Russian Empire in 1830 and 1863. Particularly after the latter date, imperial policy in the “Western provinces” (*Zapadnyi krai*), a designation that included not only the mainly Ukrainian southwest provinces but also the six “Lithuanian” and “Belarussian” guberniyas) specifically aimed to reduce Polish cultural influence, lessen Polish economic power, and restrain the Catholic Church.⁴ In the struggle to “reclaim this ancient Russian land”, the local peasant population (particularly those of Orthodox faith) were regarded by official Russia as allies against the Polish nobility – *szlachta*. Even Lithuanians, whose culture and language were unmistakably distant from Russian, were seen not as a threat but as a group to be wooed in hopes of creating a breach between them and Polish/Catholic culture.⁵ Speaking generally, after 1863, the Russian government saw one main enemy in the Western region: the Polish *szlachta*. The imperial authorities welcomed any weakening of the Poles and, conversely, anything that might work to strengthen the Polish position vis-à-vis the Russians met with strong disapproval.

The other “least-favored nationality” in the Southwest was, undoubtedly, the Jewish community. While few historians still uphold the old accusation that the Russian government actively fomented pogroms, it seems no less evident that official Russia regarded the Jews with great suspicion and discomfort. The “temporary laws” of May 1882, which further restricted Jewish

³ I have tried to describe the so-called *vozsoedinenie* of 1875 in *The ‘End’ of the Uniate Church in the Russia: The Vozsoedinenie of 1875*, „Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas”, 1995, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 28–40.

⁴ On this process see, for example, T. Weeks, *Defining Us and Them: Poles and Russians in the „Western Provinces”, 1863–1914*, „Slavic Review”, 1994, vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 26–40.

⁵ To be sure, when Lithuanians began actively opposing Polish influences in the Catholic church and other cultural institutions around the turn of the century, the Russian government did not support the Lithuanian nationalists against the Poles. On the complicated Russian-Polish-Lithuanian nexus, see T. Weeks, *Lithuanians, Poles and the Russian Imperial Government at the Turn of the Century*, „Journal of Baltic Studies”, 1994, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 289–304.

rights to protect “Russian peasants” against “Jewish exploitation,” are indicative of the general attitude felt by Russian officialdom toward the Jews. While Russian officials criticized and condemned the 1881 pogroms, they also rationalized them as a “natural response” of the local peasantry against the economic predominance of Jews in the region.⁶ This rationalization took legal form in the May 1882 laws. In the ensuing decades, Jews appeared in official documents almost always as draft dodgers, tax evaders, usurers, and (particularly the younger generation) socialists, that is, as an element from which the “rooted Russian population” had to be protected.⁷

Where, then, did Ukrainians fit into this “national calculus”? In almost all cases, official Russia placed the Ukrainian peasant masses squarely on the “Russian” side against both Jews and Poles. How, then, can this argument be reconciled with the brutally anti-Ukrainian policy of the Russian Empire during the same period? The seeming contradiction arises, I believe, out of a divergence both in political and national values and in the very definitions of keywords and concepts as understood by Russian officials around the turn of the century and by educated people a century later. The Russian Empire, as has often been mentioned, was no nation-state, and its understanding of the term “Russian” (nearly always *ruskii* in official sources, rarely *rossiiskii*)⁸ was fluid and “situationally-bound”. Our present sense of strict boundaries between nationalities, and particularly between Ukrainians and Russians, was entirely foreign to officialdom in the late Russian Empire, as was (for the most part) the very high value we assign to national identity. In many respects, the Russian Empire remained “pre-national”: no legal definition for “Russian” existed, and when officials were obliged to determine the “nationality” of a given person,

⁶ A very interesting collection of official documents attempting to explain the reasons for the 1881 pogroms is The Russian State Historical Archive: Российский государственный исторический архив (Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskiy Arkhiv; hereinafter: RGIA), f. 821, op. 9, 1881, d. 126, *Perepiska po povodu byvshego na iuge Rossii antievreiskogo dvizheniia*. Here, as so often, the local Ukrainian population appears only as a formless peasant mass.

⁷ To be sure, various opinions existed regarding how best to protect local interests from Jewish economic pressures. The governor of Volhynia, for example, advocated in his 1895 report that the Pale of Settlement be abolished. RGIA, *Chital'nyi zal*, op. 1, d. 17 (Volhynia, 1895), p. 8.

⁸ *Ruskii* is the normal adjective used when speaking of the Russian language, culture, and even religion. *Rossiiskii* is a much more abstract term that refers to “Russian” in a geographical or administrative sense; hence, the Russian Empire is *Rossiiskaia Imperiia*; similarly, the present-day Russian Federation is *Rossiiskaia Federatsiia*. In normal administrative practice, however, *ruskii* was often used where *rossiiskii* (the more neutral term referring to the country and its inhabitants of non-Russian ethnicity) might be expected.

in the final instance, religion, not language or culture, nearly always outweighed all other factors.⁹ Thus, the Ukrainians, officially entirely Orthodox after 1875, disappeared as a separate group according to this criterion. Added to this the proximity of the Ukrainian and Russian languages, the Russian historical conception of Kievan Rus' as the "cradle of the Russian state", the relative weakness of Ukrainian high culture (for obvious reasons!) in the 18th and 19th centuries and the almost obsessive official fear of the Poles in the region, and the Ukrainians quickly fade into a faceless mass of peasants who could easily be won over for the Russian state and Russian culture.

The brutal measures adopted against Ukrainian (high) culture during the reigns of Alexander II, Alexander III, and Nicholas II might seem to contradict this image of Ukrainians and Russians marching together hand-in-hand against the combined Polish and Jewish threats. However, using official Russia's terms, the punishments meted out to the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius and the restrictions placed on publishing and education in Ukrainian targeted not the "Ukrainian people" (probably "Little Russian folk" [*malorusskoe plemia*] in official parlance) but "Ukrainophiles", that is, that misguided and narrow group of educated people who aimed to split up the Great Russian (not to say "great-Russian") nation. Where we find a unity (between "Ukrainophiles", that is, Ukrainian national thinkers and leaders, and the Ukrainian peasant masses), official Russia saw a clear break.¹⁰ The added fact that most Ukrainian thinkers combined their national ideals with social and political demands could only further alienate them from the Russian government. By restricting the growth of Ukrainian high culture, that is, print culture and national self-consciousness, the Russian government aimed simultaneously at increasing the gap between Ukrainian *intelligentsia*

⁹ Officially, of course, this tendency was denounced, particularly as the equation "Catholic = Polish" would cut off many thousand Belarussians and (after 1905) Ukrainians from the "Russian nation". But even after 1905, when the government drew up an electoral law for a specifically "Russian" Duma representative for the Kholm area, it could do no better than to fall back on the religious criterion which, unlike the national, at least had legal standing. On this latter case, see T. Weeks, *Defending Our Own: Government and the Russian Minority in the Kingdom of Poland, 1905–1914*, „Russian Review”, 1995, vol. 54, no. 4, pp. 539–551.

¹⁰ This gap between Ukrainophiles and „Little Russian people” is also characteristic of Russian nationalists from Petr Struve to the Kiev „Club of Russian Nationalists”. An interesting expression of this conception is found in Sergey N. Shchegolev's notoriously anti-Ukrainian (but nonetheless worth reading) work, see С.Н. Щеголев, *Украинское движение как современный этап южнорусского сепаратизма*, Киев 1912. Shchegolev considered himself a *Maloross'* but attacked the „Ukrainophiles” as irresponsible intellectuals seeking their own political advantage.

and *narod* and decreasing cultural differences between “Little Russians” and, to use Struve’s term, “general Russian culture”.

One may, of course, question the sincerity of Russian officials in their dogged refusal to grant a separate status to the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian nation. However, we should not underestimate the ability of human beings to remain steadfastly attached to familiar and comfortable beliefs and conceptions, particularly when any undermining of these conceptions would call forth a thorough rethinking of political and social conditions as a whole. For official Russia, the simple formula that Ukrainians, Belarussians, and Great Russians each formed “branches” of one mighty Russian people, loyally supporting the autocracy and Orthodoxy, was too convenient and too deeply rooted to be easily budged by any external reality. According to this formula, “Russians” made up a majority of the Empire’s population; without it, the non-Russians predominated. Relinquishing this formula would have required a complete re-thinking of the government’s rationalization of policy in the Western provinces, constantly referred to in official sources as “true-Russian land” (*iskonno-russkii krai*) – the previous simple dichotomy of treacherous Poles and loyal “Russian” peasants would need to be abandoned. And, of course, allowing for the existence of Ukrainians as distinct from Russians would have forced the Russian government to define nationality more precisely than it had ever done before. Hence, it is hardly surprising that, to the very end, the officials of Imperial Russia never seriously considered abandoning this comfortable scheme.

Up to now, I have stated, and quite possibly overstated, my conception of official Russia’s approach to the “Ukrainian problem” in general terms, rather dogmatically and without much specific documentation. In what follows, I will try to back up the above comments with archival documentation. I will first discuss the “Ukrainian problem” as it appears in annual reports from the Southwest (1894–1914), then consider the Ukrainian component of the Western Zemstvo controversy, and finally look at the Kholm project. In all three instances, Ukrainians per se hardly appear at all. Once again, official discourse defined Ukrainians out of the picture by allowing only a simple dichotomy of “Russian” vs “Poles”.¹¹

Looking over two decades of annual reports from the Southwest, one is struck by the numerous mentions of Ukrainians and the Ukrainian national movement.¹² Specific topics are commented upon nearly every year: agrarian

¹¹ It is worth noting that Jews are also „defined out of the picture” in official discussions of the Western *zemstvo* and Kholm province.

¹² While I have not examined every report (*gubernatorskii otchet*) from the three Southwest provinces during the period between 1894 and 1914, I have looked at nearly all

difficulties, the inadequacy of municipal governments, the low level of education among peasants, the Jewish and Polish problems. But I have been unable to find a single reference to the Ukrainian national movement, and indeed almost no mention even of the local “rooted population” other than as uneducated “Russians” – or, occasionally – “Little Russians”. When the governor of Kiev province mentioned disturbances at the University of Kiev in 1898, “grounded in purely nationalist interests”, he was referring to the agitation of local Polish students.¹³ Similarly, agrarian disorders are mentioned time and again, but never in the context of national disagreements except, of course, between “Russian” peasants and Polish landlords. For example, the governor of Podolia mentions in his 1905 report that brochures “in the local little-Russian language” calling for agrarian strikes and boycotts were distributed in regions near the Austrian border, but in this context, seems concerned not with the national aspect here, but with the social problem of agrarian relations.¹⁴

A vivid but not exceptional description of the local peasantry is given by the Volhynia governor in 1901: “In the national life (*narodnaia zhizn*) of Volhynia province one painful issue is the lack of development of peasant masses, its total lack of education, the complete absence of consciousness of responsibility, or respect for others’ property, and its crushing illiteracy”.¹⁵ The main problem with local peasants was not “national”, but a matter of their ignorance and “low cultural level”. It was hoped that with the spread of government schools, the local peasantry would be “lifted” out of this benighted state. Despite this ignorance and frequent agrarian disorders, most governors seemed to agree with what one called the “age-old loyalty of the peasant estate” (to the Tsar).¹⁶ Perhaps this persistent desire to see in the peasant estate a bulwark for the Empire acted to blind local officials to the real dissatisfactions – including those of a national kind – among local peasants.

In the one instance where a governor specifically referred to “Little Russians”, he was referring to the lack of an educated class among the local Ukrainian peasants of Kiev province (as opposed to the generally educated

that were available at RGIA: eleven from Kiev province, fourteen from Podolia, and sixteen from Volhynia.

¹³ RGIA, f. 1282, op. 3, 1899, d. 266, l. 28v.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, f. 1263, op. 4, d. 49, l. 535v.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, f. 1282, op. 3, d. 545, l. 12 (Volhynia, 1901).

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, f. 1284, op. 194, 1906, d. 47, l. 3 (Volhynia, 1905). Here the governor explains the weakness of the local revolutionary movement by reference to peasant loyalty. Not incidentally, the revolutionaries mentioned are Jews.

Poles). In this context, the governor went on to speak in favor of introducing *zemstva* institutions in the region, which, in his words, would serve as “a strong impetus toward a speeding-up of the process of cultural improvement of the local population”. When describing the composition of these organs of local self-government, however, Ukrainians once again disappear entirely: “Both [local] nationalities, the Russian just as the Polish, should be included in the process of rural improvement [“construction”], but under the strict control of government power”.¹⁷

National questions did concern local governors, but here again, the “target” national groups were Jews and Poles. The fundamental rhetorical model was that “two-state (and national!) principles” were at work in the Western provinces. One finds this rhetoric in Stolypin’s speeches, which also crops up in other governors’ reports. The governor of Volhynia province saw this “battle” continuing, albeit in muted form, even at the end of the 19th century: “At the present time, one cannot consider as completely ended the age-old struggle in Volhynia between two state principles and nationalities, the Russian-Orthodox and the Polish-Latin, though this struggle at present does not exhibit itself in specific manifestations”.¹⁸ This quotation is also interesting in its rhetorical equating nationality with religion, a phenomenon that usually works on a deeper, subconscious level. Here again, Ukrainians, as Orthodox believers, “disappeared” into the mass of “Russian people”.

Governors in the Southwest often emphasized that their provinces were becoming increasingly similar to those in central Russia as Polish influence declined. As early as 1894, the governor of Volhynia used this argument to press for introducing *zemstva* and *zemskie nachal’niki* in his province.¹⁹ Similarly, his colleague in neighboring Podolia stated that despite the presence there of Jews and Poles, the province increasingly took on a “Russian face”.²⁰ After 1905, the frequent (laudatory) mention of the activities of the Union of Russian People in the region continued the juxtaposition of “Russians” vs Poles and Jews.²¹ To name just one instance, in 1909, the Podolia governor

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, f. 1284, op. 194, 1909, d. 25, l. 4 (Kiev, 1908).

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, *Chital’nyi zal*, op. 1, d. 17 (Volhynia, 1896), l. 9.

¹⁹ *Ibidem* (Volhynia, 1894), ll. 4–5.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, f. 1284, op. 223, 1898, d. 11 lit.B.P., l. 17. Once again the use of language is interesting: “the hostile Polish and Jewish elements, faced with the persistent carrying-out of the existing restrictive measures, is not able (*ne v silakh*) to prevent Podolia province from taking on a more and more Russian aspect (*bolee i bolee uspeschno russkii oblik*).

²¹ The Union of the Russian People was particularly strong in Podolia and Volyn provinces, and several local Duma delegates, including Orthodox priests, were active in that organization.

praised the formation in Kamenets of the “Union of Russian Nationalists” as a “counterweight to Polish influence”.²² Again, no mention of Ukrainians.

This “conspiracy of silence”, to use a rather exalted phrase, is similarly present in the government’s rhetoric in the Western Zemstvo project.²³ The project of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) emphasizes, in a manner now familiar to us, the “historical background” of the national struggle in the Western lands: “Being a historically Russian country (*iskonnyi russkii krai*), during the course of long centuries, the western borderland found itself politically subject to Poland, and in this area there took place a never-ending struggle between the Russian-Orthodox and Polish-Latin nationalities”.²⁴ The strength of the Polish landlords and Catholic culture in the region thus required, even after 1905, safeguards for the local “Russian” population here. Hence the government project included national curiae, required at least half of the positions on *zemstva* boards (*upravy*) to be filled by Russians, and set down limits to the number of non-Russians that these *zemstva* would be allowed to hire.²⁵ To be sure, the government project did not do away with property requirements in determining suffrage, but here, I think, the fear was of “peasant darkness” and not of Ukrainian “separatism”.

The Kholm project also followed these same rhetorical paths. The local “Russian” – sometimes “Little Russian” – population needed government assistance in order to fend off Polonization and aggressive Catholic activity. While Ukrainian publicists did point out that the local “Russian” population belonged, in fact, to the Ukrainian ethnicity, these voices were not reflected in official discourse on the subject.²⁶ This continued to stress the Polish/Russian dichotomy and ignore any substantial differences between the local “Russians” and Russian peasants in, for example, Tambov province. The main issue was “Russian national interests” in the region.²⁷ Even those official figures such as Warsaw Governor General Imeretinsky, who opposed the creation

²² RGIA, *Chital'nyi zal*, op. 1, d. 72 (Podolia, 1909), l. 139.

²³ It is also remarkable that in the Duma and State Council debates on the subject the Ukrainian issue almost never came up.

²⁴ RGIA, f. 1278, op. 2, 1910, d. 1171, l. 11v.

²⁵ For more on the Western Zemstvo project in general, see T. Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia...*, chap. 7: *Rural Administration and Nationality: The Western Zemstvo Project*.

²⁶ See, for example, М.С. Грушевський, *За український маслак. (В справі Холмщини)*, Київ 1907; and О. Білоусенко, *Холмска справа*, Киев 1909.

²⁷ RGIA, f. 1276, op. 2, 1906, d. 35, l. 652. The MVD bill sent to the Duma states explicitly that the creation of the Kholm province is envisioned as but the first step “to safeguard Russian nationalist interests in Kholm Rus’, and [to assure] the progressive integration [*slitiannie*] of the latter [i.e., the Kholm region] with the interior provinces of the Empire”.

of a new province to protect local “Russians”, hastened to state that all measures had already been taken to restrain “Polonizing” influences.²⁸

The impulse for the Kholm project after 1905 was given by the fact that some 200,000 former Uniates took advantage of the April 17, 1905 edict of religious freedom to leave the Orthodox church and become Catholics. Because Russian nationalists refused to consider, in part correctly, these newly converted Catholics as Poles, the sponsors of the Kholm project tried to press an ethnographic rather than religious definition of “Russian”.²⁹ The authors of the project emphasized that the newly created province, despite the large percentage of Catholics living there, would nonetheless be “Russian” and argued against the facile equation of a Catholic and a Pole.³⁰ Despite this, the fact remains that the Catholic clergy was undoubtedly considered to be (and probably correctly!) aggressively Polish in sentiment and sympathies. As for Ukrainians per se, once again, they are invisible. Kiev Governor General Sukhomlinov’s words in favour of the new province were repeated, in a slightly different form, by nearly all supporters of the project right up to the gala “opening” of the province in 1912:

The separation of the Kholm region from the Vistula country [*Privislinskii krai*, i.e., Russian Poland] is absolutely essential in the interests of preserving the Russian nationality and can scarcely call forth an outbreak of religious or nationalistic agitation since, in recent years, the Poles have attempted in various ways to force the local population towards conversion to Catholicism.³¹

Poles and Catholicism, not Ukrainian separatism, represented the danger to Russian interests in this area.

Arguments based on “silences” are clearly risky, and the imperial government certainly did oppose the Ukrainian national movement as such. Such measures as the use of Ukrainian language in local schools were, of course, bitterly combatted by official Russia.³² I do not wish to argue that the Russian Imperial government was at all friendly to the Ukrainian national movement, but rather that it was on the whole ignorant of it and far more concerned with Poles, Jews, and agricultural issues than “Ukrainian separatism”,

²⁸ *Ibidem*, f. 797, op. 68, I otd. 1 stol, d. 4, l. 60. Imeretinskii’s comments date from 1899.

²⁹ The best example of this is В. Францев, *Карты русского и православного населения Холмской Руси*, Варшава 1909 – but note even in the title the inability of Frantsev to discard Orthodoxy as a determining factor. Frantsev, a professor at the University of Warsaw, also did not consider „Little Russians” as in any major way distinct from Great Russians.

³⁰ RGIA, f. 821, op. 10, 1905, d. 213, ll. 8f.

³¹ *Ibidem*, f. 1276, op. 2, 1906, d. 35, l. 16. Sukhomlinov’s words date from 1906.

³² On the latter issue, see for example, RGIA, f. 1276, op. 4, 1908, d. 701.

even after 1905. The failure of the Russian Imperial government even to perceive the importance and danger of the Ukrainian national movement seems to me emblematic of the inability of the Romanov Empire to deal with the issue of nationality as an intellectual and political category. To jump ahead into the 21st century, the continued embrace of this outdated imperial ideology by certain (powerful) elements in Moscow that “Ukraine is merely a province of Russia” is not just reactionary but borders on the ludicrous.

Theodore R. Weeks, professor of history at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, where he teaches courses in modern world, European, and Russian history. He has also taught at the College of Europe, Natolin (Warsaw), and spent one year as a Distinguished Fulbright Professor at the University of Warsaw. Among his works are *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996), *From Assimilation to Antisemitism: the “Jewish Question” in Poland, 1850–1914* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006), and *Vilnius between Nations 1795–2000* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2015). His research interests include nationalism, ethnic relations, antisemitism, and, more recently, the history of technology. He is presently working on a history of radio in interwar Poland (1920–1939).

Theodore R. Weeks, profesor historii na Southern Illinois University w Carbondale, gdzie wykłada historię współczesną, europejską i rosyjską. Wykładał również w Kolegium Europejskim w Natolinie (Warszawa) i spędził rok jako stypendysta programu Fulbrighta na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim. Opublikował m.in. *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996), *From Assimilation to Antisemitism: the “Jewish Question” in Poland, 1850–1914* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006), and *Vilnius between Nations 1795–2000* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2015). Jego zainteresowania badawcze obejmują nacjonalizm, stosunki etniczne, antysemityzm, a ostatnio także historię technologii. Obecnie pracuje nad historią radia w międzywojennej Polsce (1920–1939).